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A bstract
This dissertation analyzes the mechanism of the stagnation in Japan after 
1990, focusing on the relationship between the credit market and the produc­
tivity slowdown. The key mechanism is that the credit market has a function 
to reallocate the production resources from the less-productive to the more- 
productive producers, and that if this function is hampered, then the average 
productivity level of the economy falls and the productivity slowdown occurs. 
This dissertation consists of three chapters. Chapter 1 estimates the productiv­
ity growth rate in Japan, and confirms the productivity slowdown in the 1990’s. 
Chapter 2 provides a heterogeneous agents model with different productivity 
levels of the agents, and analyzes how the restriction on collateral liquidation 
affects the productivity slowdown. This analysis links the feature of the Japanese 
credit market with the productivity slowdown after 1990. Chapter 3 analyzes 
the capital- and the investment-output ratios under a credit crunch, and shows 
that the credit market shock is consistent with the observed feature of these 
ratios in Japan after 1990.
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Introduction
The recent stagnation in Japan after 1990 has set a big challenge to macroeco­
nomics. The question is why the economic growth rate had been low for more 
than a decade, despite the strong growth until 1990 and the large fiscal and 
monetary expansions after 1990. To explain this phenomenon, Fumio Hayashi 
and Edward Prescott have published the important work in the Review of Eco­
nomic Dynamics in 2002. They estimate the decline of the productivity growth 
rate in Japan, and show that this empirical finding explains the dynamics of the 
Japanese economy after 1990 in the standard exogenous growth model. After 
their analysis, researchers started investigating the mechanism of the productiv­
ity slowdown, and empirically found that it was accompanied by biased credit 
and resource allocations across the firms. This PhD dissertation adds to this 
effort by clarifying the theoretical mechanism of the interaction between the 
biased credit and resource allocations and the productivity slowdown.
The theoretical analyses in this dissertation extend the path-breaking work 
of Nobuhiro Kiyotaki and John Moore, which was published in the Journal 
of Political Economy in 1997. The analyses in this dissertation clarifies that 
the insight of their work synthesizes the classical debate on the source of the 
economic fluctuation between Edward Prescott and Lawrence Summers in the 
Fall 1986 issue of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review. 
In this debate, Prescott advocates that productivity shocks are the driving force 
of the economic fluctuation, while Summers argues that breakdown of exchange 
in the economy is more likely to explain the economic fluctuation.
The insight of Kiyotaki and Moore is that the productivity levels differ across 
the producers in the economy, and that the credit market reallocates the pro­
duction resources from the less-productive to the more-productive. As shown in
this dissertation, a corollary of their insight is that if the intertemporal exchange 
in the credit market is broken down, then it reduces the resource allocation to 
the more-productive, and lowers the average productivity level of the economy. 
Hence, the insight of Kiyotaki and Moore implies tha t Prescott and Summers 
look at the same mechanism of the economic fluctuation from different per­
spectives. This dissertation shows that the synthesis of the Prescott-Summers 
debate is important to understand the mechanism of the productivity slowdown 
in Japan after 1990.
This dissertation consists of three chapters. Chapter 1 estimates the pro­
ductivity growth rate in Japan, and confirms the productivity slowdown in the 
1990’s. Chapter 2 provides a heterogeneous agents model with different pro­
ductivity levels of the agents, and analyzes how the restriction on collateral 
liquidation affects the productivity slowdown. This analysis links the feature of 
the Japanese credit market with the productivity slowdown after 1990. Chapter 
3 analyzes the capital- and the investment-output ratios under a credit crunch, 
and shows that the credit market shock is consistent with the observed feature 
of these ratios in Japan after 1990.
Chapter 1
Productivity  Growth in Japan  
for 1974-1998
A bstract
This chapter estimates the productivity growth rate in Japan for 1974-1998, 
controlling for unobserved capacity utilization and non-constant returns to scale 
in production. We adopt the total factor productivity (TFP) as the productivity 
measure. We compare the results between the two sets of the proxies for unob­
served capacity utilization: the working-hours of labor and the energy inputs. 
We observe a productivity slowdown in the 1990’s by both of the proxies.
1.1 Introduction
The Japanese economy has experienced a long stagnation after 1990. The aver­
age growth rate of real GDP per working-age population dropped from 3.26% 
in the 1981-1990 period to 0.95% in the 1990-2003 period. There has been pro­
posed a number of hypotheses to explain this phenomenon. One of the main 
hypotheses is a productivity slowdown, as observed by Hayashi and Prescott 
(2002) in the 1990s. They use the Solow residual (the growth accounting), and 
estimate that the aggregate productivity growth rate dropped from 3.7% in the 
1983-1990 period to 0.3% in the 1990-2000 period. They argue that this is the 
main cause of the stagnation in Japan after 1990.
A potential problem of their estimation is that the Solow residual contains
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some other components than the productivity growth. The Solow residual is the 
residual of the output growth net of the growth of the observed inputs, such as 
capital and labor, and thus measures the growth of the unobserved components 
in production. The unobserved components include productivity of the inputs 
and unobserved capacity utilization. The productivity of the inputs consists of 
the productivity level independent of the amounts of the inputs, so-called total 
factor productivity (TFP ) , 1 and the effect of non-constant returns to scale, which 
varies with the amounts of the inputs. Over all, the Solow residual contains the 
growth and change of the three effects; the unobserved capacity utilization, TFP, 
and the effect of non-constant returns to scale.
Hayashi and Prescott estimate the growth rate of TFP by the Solow residual. 
Thus, they implicitly assume that the effects of unobserved capacity utilization 
and non-constant returns to scale are negligible without confirming this in the 
data. But after Hayashi and Prescott’s work, several works estimate the TFP 
growth rates by controlling for the unobserved capacity utilization. Most of the 
works confirm the TFP slowdown in Japan in the 1990’s. Fukao and Kwon 
(2004) contain a survey.
However, Kawamoto (2004) obtains a different result tha t there was no TFP 
slowdown in the 1990s, and concludes that the unobserved capacity utilization 
and non-constant returns to scale in production caused the observed decline of 
the Solow residual in the 1990s. His result is important, because his estimation 
controls for both of the unobserved capacity utilization and non-constant re­
turns to scale in production in a unified framework induced from the firm’s cost 
minimization, while the preceding works use the measures of unobserved capac­
ity utilization estimated independently of their estimation methods. Kawamoto 
follows the literature to control for the unobserved capacity utilization and non­
constant returns to scale in production by regression, and ’’purify” the Solow 
residual, such as Hall (1989), Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (1993 and 1995), 
Basu (1996) and Basu and Kimball (1997). He especially applies the method of 
Basu and Kimball to the Japanese data.
The Basu-Kimball method controls for the unobserved capacity utilization
1Basu, Fernald, and Kimball (2004) calls the Solow residual as ”TFP” and what we call 
as TFP here as ’’technology.” But in this chapter, we choose to follow the terminology in the 
macroeconomic theory literature.
by the working-hours per worker as the proxy. The assumption behind this 
proxy is that the firms optimize all the margins of the capacity utilization, 
and endogenously correlate the working-hours per worker (the observed margin) 
with the unobserved margins. But there is a concern to directly apply this 
method to the Japanese data in the 1990s. As will be described in the main 
section, the statutory workweek of labor kept declining over the 1990’s since 
the 1988 revision of the Labor Standards Law.2 Such a regulatory restriction 
would change the environment of the firm’s cost minimization, and then the 
correlation between the working-hours per worker and the unobserved capacity 
utilization. As will be shown later, the effect of the regulatory change on the 
working-hours per worker was especially significant for the 1988-1993 period. 
The large exogenous decline of the working-hours per worker in the early 1990’s 
could lead to over-estimating the decline of the unobserved capacity utilization, 
and underestimating the decline of TFP growth rates in the 1990’s.
In this chapter, we separate the effect of the reduction of the statutory work­
week of labor from the working-hours of labor, and then apply the Basu-Kimball 
method to estimate the TFP growth rates in Japan. For the separation, we ex­
ploit the observation that the reduction of the working-days took the main part 
in the reduction of the statutory workweek of labor. Under the firm’s cost min­
imization problem robust to the exogenous reduction of the working-days by 
laws, we use the change of the average working-hours of a worker per day as the 
proxy of the unobserved capacity utilization. We observe a TFP slowdown in 
the 1990’s by this method.
Also, to be immune from the effect of the reduction of the statutory workweek 
of labor, we use the energy-inputs as the proxy for the unobserved capacity 
utilization, and provide another estimate of the TFP growth rates. This method 
is similar to Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (1995) and Basu (1996). We 
show that a TFP slowdown is observed in the 1990’s by this method as well.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 1 .2  describes the regu­
latory change of the working-hours per worker. Section 1.3 describes the model. 
Section 1.4 shows the estimation results by the Basu-Kimball method. Section
2In fact, Kawamoto is concerned with the secular down-ward trend in the working-hours, 
and uses the over-time to control for the unobserved capacity utilization. But we will argue 
below that the over-time is also affected by the reduction of the statutory workweek of labor.
3
1.5 shows the estimation results by the energy inputs. Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 Statutory workweek of labor in the 1990’s
In this section, we describe the reduction of the statutory workweek of labor in 
the 1990’s. By the late 1980’s, the Japanese economy had achieved the successful 
economic growth and the large current account surplus. In 1988, the govern­
ment set a long-term policy to reduce the working-hours of Japanese workers to 
increase their leisure time and consumption.3 The objective of this policy was 
to correct the trade imbalance and to enhance the workers’ welfare. In the same 
year, the Labor Standards Law was revised to reduce the statutory workweek 
of labor. This revision gradually reduced the statutory workweek from 48 hours 
to 46 hours by March 1991, and to 44 hours by March 1994. From April 1994, 
the workweek was reduced to 40 hours. But the medium- and small-sized estab­
lishments with not more than 300 employees were allowed to continue having 
44 hours until March 1997.4 Even after 1997, the labor laws set a ’’guidance” 
period for the government to induce the medium- and small- establishments to 
observe the 40-hour workweek by 1999. A policy description issued by the Min­
istry of Labor in February 1998 noted that 20% of these establishments were yet 
to observe the statutory workweek.5 Thus, the implementation of the 40-hour 
statutory workweek was only gradual over the 1990’s.
The reduction of the statutory workweek was mainly implemented through 
the reduction of the working days. Figure 1.2 shows the average working-days 
per year in the economy, and Figure 1.3 shows the average working-hours of a 
worker per day. Figure 1.2 shows that there was a significant decline between 
1988 and 1993 and a slight downward trend between 1993 and 1999. Figure 1.3 
shows tha t the average working-hours of a worker per day was stable despite the
3The cabinet set this policy in a policy statement named as ’’Japan cooperating with the 
rest of the world: the 5-year economic management plan.”
4There were a few exceptions. The allowance was not applied to the financial and the 
communication industries, and the civil servants. All establishments in the mining, the trans­
portation and courier, the cleaning, and the butchery industries received this special allowance. 
In the theater industry, only the establishment with not more than 100 employees received 
the special allowance.
5Labor Standards Bureau, ”On management of the labor standards administration”, Febru­
ary 1998.
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reduction of the statutory workweek. Later, we will exploit this observation to 
exclude the effect of the regulatory change from the estimation.
The decline of the average working-hours of a worker per day after 1996 
in Figure 1.3 was not an economy-wide phenomenon, but driven by the trans­
portation and communication and the wholesale and retail industries. In these 
industries, the shares of the part-time workers significantly increased, which con­
tributed to the decline of the average working-hours of a worker per day. Figure
1.4 shows that the average over-time of a worker per day was also fluctuating 
around the constant level, so that the reduction of the working-days drove the 
permanent reduction of the working-hours in all kinds.
1.3 M odel
In this chapter, we consider that the production function takes the following 
generalized Cobb-Douglas form:
Vi,, = A t  {ft (Ui,tKi,t- 1)a‘* F  +  (1 -  , a  < 1.
(1.1)
The subscript t indicates year t. The subscript i is the index for the representa­
tive firm in industry i. fa, a^j, pi and 7 * are constants for j  =  N, K . a : ^  and 
a^K are the factor share of labor and capital, respectively, in the value-added 
(Fi)tHiftN iit)ai'N {UiytK i ^ i ) ai'K. 1/(1 — pi) is the elasticity of substitution be­
tween the value-added and the intermediate inputs. 7 * is the returns to scale in 
production. Yijt is the gross output. A ijt is the TFP level. Fiit is the unobserved 
labor effort-intensity per worker-hour. H^t is the average working-hours of a 
worker per day. We discuss the reason for this definition of H itt in the next 
section. N^t is the number of worker-days, so that H i)tN itt is worker-hours. Uiit 
is the running-time of capital. K ijt_ 1 is the amount of capital, and Mitt is the 
amount of intermediate inputs.
We consider existence of the adjustment costs of capital and labor, so that 
these two inputs are quasi-fixed. Then, because the firms cannot completely 
adjust the amounts of capital and labor when they are hit by productivity and 
demand (price) shocks, they absorb the shocks by adjusting the three margins of
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the capacity utilization, F^t, H^t, and U^t- We will describe these assumptions 
more precisely later in the specification of the firm’s cost minimization problem.
We estimate the growth rate of A iyt by a stationary linear regression. We 
take a log-linear approximation of the function (1 .1) around its steady state ,6 
and its difference such that
AlnY^ =Alm4i)t +  r]ifN(A\nFift +  Ain Hijt +  AlniVi)t)
+  77i,jc(Aln[/i)t +  A ln K i^ x )  +  r/i)M Ain MiyU (1.2)
where
_ (  7 m N [ { F H N ) ^ { U K Y K}p \
V'-N ~  [(F H N ) a"  ( V K ) ° * Y  +  (1 -  r W ' J w s  '
=  /  'ynaK l ( F H N r » ( U K r K}P \  n  *
n''K U  \ {F H N )aN (UK)a« r  + (1 -  n ) M p ) i:SS ( ‘ 1
(  7(1 — n )M p \
-  \ i x [ ( F H N ) aK ( U K r r  +  (1 -  » ) M » ) itSS ■ (1 -5)
(•)i,ss indicates the steady-state value of the variable inside the bracket for the 
firm i. We omit the firm index i and the time index t for the variables inside 
the bracket. Thus, rjij is the elasticity of production to the input at the steady 
state for j  = N , K , M.
In the literature, it is popular to calibrate the elasticities of production to 
the inputs by the cost-shares of the inputs. But this calibration requires that the 
marginal returns of the inputs equal their marginal costs at the steady state . 7 
This assumption does not hold, if the firms are credit-constrained, because the 
firms cannot invest into capital as much as they like, and the marginal return 
to capital becomes larger than its marginal cost. Also, it is necessary to assume 
that the adjustment costs are negligible around the steady state. We avoid to 
make these assumptions, and estimate the elasticities of production to the inputs 
by regression.
By decomposing the TFP growth AlnA^* into the trend growth and the
6i.e., the trend growth path.
7See Hall (1989) for more detail of the calibration.
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deviation from it, we obtain the following regression form:
Ain Yiit =Alm4i +  77^ (AlnFi|t +  Ain Hitt +  AlniVi>t) 
+ (AlnC/i^  + A\nKijt-i) - f 17^  AlnM t^
+  error. (1.6)
where AlnA* is log of the trend TFP growth rate, and the error term is the 
deviation in year t , AinA iyt — AlnAj. Thus, we estimate the TFP growth rates 
by the sum of the constant term and the error term. The problem in estimating 
(1 .6 ) is that the regressors include the two margins of the unobserved capacity 
utilization, A lnF^ and AinU^t- We adopt two methods to approximate them 
in the following.
1.4 Proxy of the unobserved capacity utiliza-
Average working-hours o f a worker per day
average working-hours of a worker per day. We consider the following cost 
minimization problem of the firm:
wsG(Fij, Hijt)V{Uij) is the total compensation for the workers. The level co­
efficient wt is taken as given by the firm. G(-, •) is the premium for the labor 
effort-intensity and the working-hours of each worker per day. V(-) is the shift 
premium to compensate the shift-work at undesirable time, such as the night. It 
is assumed that the shift premium is a function of the running-time of capital. 
The intuition for this assumption is that the firm needs to have the workers
tion:
In the first method, we approximate the unobserved capacity utilization by the
mm
[wtG(Fitt, H itt)V(Uitt)Niit +
s.t. Yitt > Y
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work longer at undesirable time to run the capital stock longer. G and V  are 
multiplicative with each other in the total compensation by assumption.
S(*, •,*,') is the adjustment-cost function for labor and capital. The ad­
justment cost makes these inputs quasi-fixed, and causes the fluctuation of the 
capacity utilization. We do not use any further properties of the adjustment-cost 
functions in this chapter. rs is the nominal interest rate. Pm jj  is the price of 
the intermediate inputs for the firm i at each year s. These prices are all nomi­
nal. Note that the nominal cost minimization problem is equivalent to the real 
problem. If we divide the minimization problem by the current output price, we 
can transform it into the cost minimization problem with real variables after a 
few steps of calculation. The constraint is the quantity constraint for the cost 
minimization, given an arbitrary amount of production Y .
Note tha t the cost-minimization problem is robust to imperfect competition 
in the output market and existence of the demand shocks, as we can take the 
value of Y  as given. In appendix, we can show that F^t and U^t are determined 
by the following functions:
Hence, both Fiit and U^t depend on H^t. The intuition is that in the cost 
minimization, the firm optimizes all the margins of the capacity utilization. This
of a worker per day, i.e. the observed margin, with the unobserved margins of 
the capacity utilization.
(1.8)
(1.9)
behavior creates the endogenous correlation between the average working-hours
We take log-linear approximations of these functions around the steady state 
and their differences, and substitute them into (1.6). Then, we obtain
AlnY^ =Alm4i +  r]itN(A\nHi)t +  AlnN itt) +  rjitKA \n K itt- i
+  ?7i)MAlnMM +  (riitNf i tH +  T]itKuiiH) AinHijt +  error, (1.10)
where
( i . i i )
(1.12)
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Uj is the derivative of U by its j th  argument. Note tha t a^K/a^N  is constant 
and disappears when we take its difference.
Basu and Kimball (1997) propose this method of approximating the unob­
served capacity utilization by the working-hours of labor. Their original estima­
tion uses the working-hours per worker as the proxy for the unobserved capacity 
utilization, rather than the average working-hours of a worker per day. However, 
as described in the last section, there was a continuous structural change in the 
working-hours per worker in Japan over the 1990’s. If we define H i)t by the total 
working-hours per worker, then we need to introduce a time-varying constraint 
on the choice of H^t in the cost minimization problem (1.7). This violates the 
stationary relationships between Hitt, and Fift and U^t shown in (1.8) and (1.9). 
To avoid this problem, we define H^t by the average working-hours of a worker 
per day, exploiting the observation that the reduction of the working-hours per 
worker was mainly implemented through the reduction of the working-days, and 
that the average working-hours of a worker per day did not show mean change in 
the 1990’s. A straightforward interpretation of our cost minimization problem 
is that the firms take the working-days per worker as given under the Labor 
Standards Laws, and compensate the workers if they work longer in each day. 
Also note that our cost minimization problem is robust to both endogenous and 
exogenous changes of the working-days per worker, given our specification of the 
total compensation function to the workers is correct.
1.4.1 D ata  and the estim ation m ethod
We estimate (1.10) by the industry-level data in Japan between 1974 and 1998. 
Thus, we estimate the behavior of the representative firm for each industry. 
The data are taken from the Japan Industry Productivity (JIP) database, con­
structed by Fukao, Miyagawa, Kawai, and Inui, et al (2003). This database 
contains annual price and quantity data of the gross output, the capital stock, 
the worker-hours, and the intermediate inputs for 1973-1998. Annual working- 
hour data over the sample period are taken from Maitsuki Kinro Tokei, an 
establishment survey conducted by Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare.
We use the beginning-of-the-year value of the capital stock as the operat­
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ing capital stock for each year, as the model assumes one period lag between 
investment into capital and production. The database provides two series of 
the worker-hours; the quality-unadjusted worker-hours and the quality-adjusted 
worker-hours. The quality-unadjusted worker-hours are the plain sum of worker- 
hours across the different types of workers. The quality-adjusted worker-hours 
are Divisia indexes, using the wage share of each type of the workers in each 
year as the time-varying weight. We will report the estimation results under 
both types of the worker-hours.
For estimation, we use three-stage least squares (3SLS) to exploit the covari­
ance of the productivity shocks across the industries. We estimate the variance- 
covariance matrix of the error terms by the Newey-West estimator with the 
bandwidth of 2  to take into account the serial correlation of the productivity 
shocks. The instrumental variables are 1) log difference of the real oil prices in 
yen at the end of the year, deflated by CPI, 2) log difference of Nominal US 
federal fund rates, 3) log difference of national corporate tax rates , 8 and 4) a 
dummy variable on monetary contraction, which takes one in 1973, 1980, and 
1990, and zero otherwise. The last variable is provided by Kawamoto (2004). 
All the instrumental variables are lagged from 2 years to 5 years.
The sample period of the estimation is only 25 years. Given that the in­
struments are the time-series variables, the number of the industries has to be 
less than the sample years, since the estimated variance-covariance matrix of 
the error terms would be singular otherwise. We need to take the inverse of the 
estimated matrix to obtain the optimal weighting matrix for 3SLS. To deal with 
this problem, we classify the industries into the heavy-manufacturing sector, the 
light-manufacturing sector, and the non-manufacturing sector, and apply 3SLS 
for each sector. We assume that the regression-coefficients are identical across 
the industries within each sector to mitigate the small sample problem. Table
1 .1  shows the industry classification. See appendix for further discussion on the 
data detail.
8The rates in 2) and 3) are gross.
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1.4.2 E stim ation  results
We allow the estimated trend growth rate of TFP Alm4* to change its value 
in the 1990’s, and introduce the time-dummies in the constant term. Thus, we 
estimate the following regression:
AlnY^t =Alm 4 j)_9o 4- AhxA^gi- 4- rjjt^ (A \nH i}t 4- AlniV^t) 4- r^j^AXnK^t-i
4- 4- (rjj,Nfj,H 4- r)jfKujjH) AinHijt 4- error, (1.13)
The subscript j  is the index for each sector, as we assume the identical coefficients 
within the sector. AlmA^-go is the trend growth rate of TFP until 1990, and 
AlnA^gi- is the one after that. We allow the values of these dummy variables 
to vary across the industries to estimate the industry-specific trend growth rates 
of TFP. Despite the possible trend change in the 1990’s, we still estimate the 
constant elasticities of the output to the inputs rjj^ for h = N , K , M  over the 
sample period, assuming tha t the change of the elasticities was not significant 
even under the possible trend change in the 1990’s. We make this assumption 
to mitigate the problem of the small sample size in the 1990’s (8  years.)
Tables 1.2 and 1.3 show the regression result of (1.13). In Table 1.2, we 
use quality-unadjusted worker-hours for The estimates for the light-
manufacturing sector and the non-manufacturing sector show that the capital 
growth does not significantly affect the output growth in these sectors. Burn­
side, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (1995) note a similar observation in the US data. 
This result implies that the amount of capital is not a good measure for the 
capital service, even after controlling for the unobserved capacity utilization by 
the average working-hours of a worker per day. J\ is the J-statistic for the 
over-identifying restriction test. The J-statistics imply tha t the over-identifying 
restriction test is rejected at 1% level for all the industries. We find that it is dif­
ficult to satisfy the test even with other sets of instrumental variables. This may 
be due to the small sample size, which allows non-zero sample correlation be­
tween the error term of the regression and the instrumental variables even if their 
asymptotic correlation is zero.9 J2 is the p-value for the Wald-test for constant
9In the sectoral comparison, the manufacturing sectors show far better fit than the non­
manufacturing sector, given that the instrument variables are correctly chosen. This suggests 
that the functional form of the production function differs between the manufacturing and the 
non-manufacturing sectors.
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returns to scale. Note that the sum of the coefficients to A ln ii^ - i  +  AlniVi)t_i, 
Alni^i)t_i, and AlnMi)f_i equals the returns to scale in production 7 *. Hence, 
7 i =  1 is tested. The p-values imply that the heavy-manufacturing and the 
non-manufacturing sectors show constant returns to scale.
In Table 1.3, we use quality-adjusted worker-hours for The feature
of the result for the manufacturing sectors is similar to Table 1.2. The result 
for the non-manufacturing sector differs. In this sector, the absolute sizes of 
the coefficients are smaller in Table 1.3 than in Table 1.2, except the coefficient 
to the capital growth. The coefficient for the capital growth has a significantly 
minus sign in Table 1.3.
Table 1.5 shows the average TFP growth rates under the quality-unadjusted 
worker-hours and the quality-adjusted worker-hours, respectively. We calculate 
the aggregate TFP growth rates in the table by taking the weighted average of 
the estimated industrial TFP growth rates. We use
Ui'* (1.14)
1
as the weight for the industry i in year t , where is the nominal value-added 
share of the industry, and SM,i,t is the ratio of the intermediate-inputs expen­
diture to the revenue in the industry. See appendix for more detail of this 
weight. The common feature of the estimates is a T FP slowdown in the 1990’s, 
especially in the manufacturing sectors. Thus, our estimates have different im­
plication from Kawamoto (2004) ’s observation that there was no TFP slowdown. 
The reason for the different result is that our estimation method differs from 
Kawamoto’s. The main difference is that we use the average working-hours of 
a worker per day for Hi)t rather than the working-hours per worker, and do not 
pre-calibrate the values of and by the cost-shares in each industry.
Also, the classification of the industries into the sectors is different.
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1.5 Proxy of the unobserved capacity utiliza­
tion:
Energy inputs
In this section, we consider the energy inputs as an alternative proxy for the 
unobserved capacity utilization. The motivation for this alternative is to avoid 
the influence of the amendment of the labor standards on the estimation.
We assume that the running time of capital is complementary with electricity,
X
gas, and heat-supply, and follows the function
Ui*= u ( k Tt ) ’ (L15)
where J^t is the sum of the real values of electricity, gas, and heat-supply, and 
Zi,t is the energy-efficiency of capital. Electricity and gas are used as the energy 
to run the facilities. The heat-supply supplies cold and hot water, which is used 
for air-conditioning of the facilities. We call these intermediate inputs as the 
energy inputs. Accordingly, we redefine M*)t as the intermediate inputs net of 
J i , t •
We modify the cost-minimization problem (1.7) as
E ‘ I  E  n<( - t - r°) x I W t G & t ,  H iti) N u  +
m in r W 1 +  r«)
+  2  (Ni>t, K ijt, K iyt-i)]}
(1.16)
s.t. Yit > Y
Uitt =  U K itt- i
Pj^t  is the price of the energy inputs. We add the cost of J^t and the new func­
tion of the running-time of capital (1.15), and take out the shift premium V(Uijt) 
from the total compensation function to the workers. The last modification im­
plies tha t the running-time of capital is complementary with the energy inputs 
in the current method, while it is complementary with labor in the previous 
method. The intra-temporal first-order conditions for and Mi>t imply
(1 ’ { }
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where
Ui’J =  u~t i V ?  ( U 8 )
Thus, Uij is the elasticity of the running-time of capital to the ratio of the effec­
tive energy-inputs Z^tJi,t to the capital stock K^t-i- We assume this elasticity 
is constant for each firm over the sample period. Taking log and difference of
(1.17), we obtain
AinUitt = — -— { A in(Pj>ilt J i|t) -  Aln(PM>i>tMi|t)
Pi&i,K
-(- pi [AinMi<t — ai}N(A\nFij *f A1 nH^t -I- AlniV^t) 
- a ^ A l n ^ i ] } .  (1.19)
Substituting (1.19) and the definitions of rfs (1.3)-(1.5) into (1.6), we obtain
Alnyi>t =AlnAi +  7 *A\nM itt +  ^l'K [Ain(Pj|ift J i|t) -  A in(PM,i,tMitt)\ +  error.
Pi&i,K
(1.20)
Note that this equation is robust to existence of the growth of energy- 
efficiency of capital Z ijt under the assumption of constant for each industry. 
Also, labor and capital do not appear in the regressors. (1.17) provides the intu­
ition behind this result such that the expenditure ratio of the energy inputs to 
the intermediate inputs Pj,i,tJi,t/ c o n t r o l s  for the service from both 
labor and capital in the production relative to the service from the intermediate 
inputs, including the unobserved capacity utilization.
(1.20) is similar to the regression form derived by Basu (1996). The differ­
ence is that Basu uses the log-difference of the price ratio between the value- 
added and the intermediate inputs in the regressors, rather than the expenditure 
ratio between the energy inputs and the intermediate inputs, A in{Pj^tJ^t) — 
Aln(PM,i,tMitt). Even though (1.17) implies that we can replace the expenditure 
ratio in (1 .2 0 ) with the price ratio between the energy inputs and the inter­
mediate inputs by changing the associated coefficient in the regression, we use 
the expenditure ratio, since doing so is robust to the different prices set by the 
firms for the same type of goods to different customers in reality. We can use 
the energy inputs rather than the value-added in the expenditure ratio because
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of the assumption (1.15). The advantage to use the energy inputs is that we 
only need to consider the intra-temporal cost minimization by the firm to obtain 
the regression form (1.20). If we use the value-added in the expenditure ratio, 
then we need to consider the inter-temporal cost minimization problem, because 
labor and capital are not immediately adjustable due to the adjustment costs to 
the sizes of the employment and the capital stock.
1.5.1 E stim ation  results
We use 3SLS and the same data as in the previous section 1.4. We introduce 
the industry-specific time-dummies into the constant terms, and assume that 
the other coefficients are constant within the sector as in the previous section. 
Table 1.4 shows the estimation result. It shows the minus sign of the coefficient 
to the log-difference of the expenditure ratio between the energy inputs and the 
intermediate inputs for all the sectors. This implies tha t the sign of pi is minus, 
so that the value-added consisting of labor and capital is more complementary 
with the intermediate inputs than the Cobb-Douglas case, in which pi =  0.
The p-values in J 2 imply that the value of 7  is significantly lower than 1 for all 
the sectors. Also, in the light-manufacturing sector and the non-manufacturing 
sector, we have insignificant coefficients to the log-difference of the expenditure 
ratio between the energy inputs and the intermediate inputs. These observations 
suggest tha t the expenditure ratio does not fully control for the services from 
labor and capital, which might result in the significant decreasing returns to scale 
in our estimates. This result implies that the number of the average working- 
hours of a worker per day may be a better proxy than the energy inputs to 
control for the unobserved capacity utilization for the manufacturing sectors. 
But the result for the non-manufacturing sector is mixed, as the J-statistic in J\ 
implies tha t (1.20) has a better fit than (1.13) for the non-manufacturing sector.
Table 1.5 shows the average TFP growth rates estimated by the regression
(1.20). We use the same weight (1.14) as the previous section to aggregate the 
industrial TFP growth rates. As in the previous section, we observe a TFP 
slowdown in the 1990’s, especially in the manufacturing sectors. Hence, we 
confirm tha t this observation is robust to the different proxies of the unobserved
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capacity utilization considered in this chapter.
1.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we estimate the TFP growth rates in Japan for 1974-1998, 
controlling for the unobserved capacity utilization and the returns to scale in 
production. We use the two proxies to control for the unobserved capacity 
utilization; the average working-hours of a worker per day and the expenditure 
ratio between the energy inputs and the intermediate inputs. For both of the 
methods, we observe that there was a TFP slowdown in the 1990’s, especially 
in the manufacturing sectors.
We observe constant returns to scale in the heavy-manufacturing sector and 
the non-manufacturing sector, when we use the average working-hours of a 
worker per day as the proxy to control for the unobserved capacity utilization. 
However, we observe significant decreasing returns to scale for all the sectors, 
when we use the expenditure ratio between the energy inputs and the interme­
diate inputs. The reason for the latter result is likely tha t the expenditure-ratio 
does not fully control for the service from the value-added consisting of labor and 
capital. However, we also observe that the estimation with the energy inputs 
has a better fit for the non-manufacturing sector than the one with the average 
working-hours of a worker per day. This suggests that the manufacturing and 
the non-manufacturing sectors might have different types of the cost of the un­
observed capacity utilization.
A p pend ix
l .A . l  T he firm ’s cost m inim ization problem  to  derive (1.8) and (1.9)
We consider the intra-temporal cost-minimization of (1.7) by F*,*, if*,*, and £/*,*, taking 
the other variables as given. The first-order conditions are
w . G 1( F ^ , H ijt ) V ( U i 1t ) N ijt =  Aj
* i , t
v . G 2 ( F i , t , H i ' t ) V ( U i , t ) N i ,t =  K t V i , N ^ r -  
w , G { F iM  H i<t) V ' ( U i , t ) N i<t =  A i , t r,iyK ^
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G j  is the derivative of G  by its j t h  term. is the Lagrange multiplier for the 
quantity constraint of the cost minimization. These equations imply
F i ' t G ^ F ^ H i j )  =  H it tG 2 ( F itt , H i t t )
V ' ( U i , t )  =  a i tK H i t tG 2 ( F i t U H i , t )  
V ( U i , t ) a i>N U i t G ( F i t U H i t t ) '
We obtain the second equation by substituting the definitions of and 77^  given 
by (1.3) and (1.4). We assume that there exist implicit functions for F ^ t  and U^t-  
Then, we obtain the following functions:
second.
1 .A .2  Further discussion on th e  data  deta il
Iron & steel (33) and Other iron &; steel (34) show that the amounts of the value- 
added, i.e. the revenue minus the intermediate-inputs cost, significantly declined in 
1976 and in 1977, respectively. The industry code of the JIP database is in parenthesis. 
The firms in these industries often produce both types of goods. We merge the two 
industries into Iron and steel to eliminate their anomalous observations.
We correct worker-hours data in 1985. The both quality-adjusted and quality- 
unadjusted worker-hours data show sharp temporary drops in 1985 for 6  service indus­
tries: Other transportation service (63), Other social service (64), Equipment rental 
for industrial use(71), Other business services (72), Laundry, Barber, and Public Bath 
(77), and Other Personal Services (78). They axe sufficiently large to make the drop 
of worker-hours in the aggregate service industries. We do not find such movement in 
worker-hours data of the aggregate service industries from the National Accounts or 
M a i t s u k i  K i n r o  T o k e i .  We regard them as typos in the JIP database, and replace the 
both types of worker-hours in that year by the average of the data in 1984 and 1986.
1 .A .3  D erivation  o f  (1.14)
We describe the derivation of the weight to aggregate the industrial TFP growth rates 
given by (1.14). First, consider the Divisia index of the real GDP growth rate. We
F i,t  =  F ( H i , t )
The first equation is (1.8). We obtain (1.9) by substituting the first equation into the
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follow Nakamura, et al. (1992), pp.110-111, to obtain the index. In continuous time, 
the nominal GDP growth rate can be written as
j t {e = E - a t
+e («., d Y i , t  jj d M i ji't ~ d T ~  d t  
By dividing both sides by Y , i ( P i , t Y i,t ~  P M , i , tM i , t),
= |  jln -  Pu,i,tMi,t ) j  I
d  v  d P i t / d t  75 * d P M ,i , t /d t
P i,tY i,t -  P i .tY .t  />M P M ,i ,M ,t  P „  ( ,=EF* ^ 2 i(P i,tYi,t P M,i,tMi^t) P i,tYi,t P M,i,t-^di,t
td \z" dY i t / d t  j~> -jtyr d M i t / d t
p i,tY i,t -  p M ,i,tM iit P i,tYi,t Y i,t ~  P M ,i,tM iyt M . t+E
d(\nPijt')/ dt s M,i,td(\nPM,i,t)/dt ( ^ > d(\iiYi^i) /  dt sjvf)i)td(lnil</t)^ )/dt
where
P i,tYi,t ~  P M ,i,t^ i ,t
Wi,t = ^2i{Pi,tYi,t PM,i,t^di,t)
  PM,i,t^di,t
SM,i,t p v
We define the real GDP growth rate by the second term of the right-hand side of the 
equation. In discrete-time, we approximate d x / d t  by x t  — x t - 1 , and obtain
E AlnFi,* -  sM,i,t AlnAfi>t 
“>M-------- ;--------   (1-21)
{ 1 -  SM,i,t
as the real GDP growth rate. If we substitute (1.13) into (1.21), the real GDP growth 
rate becomes
E AlnA-ij -f- T]itN + tji^ k Aln(I7i$.K'i$_i) -f- (?7i,M ^M,i,t)AlniV/^4Ui t  ;   .
. 1 -  SM,i,t
(1.22)
It can be shown that if there is no mark-up, then t)^m  =  SM ,i,t at the steady state, so 
that the real GDP growth rate is decomposed into the TFP growth rate and the 
input growth rate, including the unobserved capacity utilization. Hence, we use 
a ^ t/l — SM ,i ,t as the weight attached to the industry V s  TFP growth rate in year 
t .
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Table 1.1: Industry classification
JIP code Heavy-manufacturing JIP code Light-manufacturing
27 Basic chemicals 1 1 Livestock products
28 Chemical fibers 1 2 Processed fishery 
products
29 Other chemicals 14 Other foods
30 Petroleum products 15 Beverages
31 Coal products 16 Tobacco
33-34* Iron Sz steel 17 Natural textile
35 Nonferrous metal 19 Other textile products
36 Metal products 2 0 Apparel
37 General machinery 2 1 Lumber&: Wood
38 Electrical machinery 2 2 Furniture Sz glass
for industrial use 23 Paper
39 Electrical machinery 24 Publishing Sz printing
for household use 25 Leather
40 Other electrical machinery 26 Rubber products
41 Motor vehicles 32 Stone, clay Sz glass
42 Ships 45 Miscellaneous
43 Other transportation 
equipment
manufacturing
44 Precision instruments
JIP code Non-manufacturing
46 Construction
47 Civil engineering
48 Electric utilities
49. Gas utilities
53 Wholesale trade
54 Retail trade
55 Finance
56 Insurance
57 Real estate
59 Railroad transportation
60 Trucking
61 Water transportation
62 Air transportation
63 Other transportation services
64 Telephone Sz telegraph
71 Equipment rental for industrial use
72 Other business services
73 Amusement Sz recreation services
74 Radio Sz television
75 Restaurants
76 Hotels Sz other lodging places
77 Laundry, barber, Sz public bath
Note: 33 — 34* implies a merged industry. See appendix for the data detail.
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Table 1.1 continued.
JIP code Excluded from the analysis (15.8%)
1 Rice Sz Wheat
2 Other Farms
3 Stockbreeding Sz Sericulture
4 Veterinary Sz Agricultural services
5 Forestry
6 Fishing
7 Coal mining
8 Metal mining
9 Oil Sz Gas extraction
1 0 Other mining
13 Rice-polishing Sz flour-milling
18 Chemical textile
50 Waterworks
51 Water services for industrial use
52 Waste disposal
58 Housing (including imputed services)
65 Postal services
6 6 Private educational services
67 Research
6 8 Private medical services
69 Other social services
70 Advertising
78 Other personal services
79 Educational services (Government)
80 Medical services (Government)
81 Other services (Government)
82 Medical services (Non-profit)
83 Other services (Non-profit)
84 Unclassified
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Table 1.2: Regression coefficients of (1.13): Quality-unadjusted worker-hours
Heavy Light Non
-manufacturing -manufacturing -manufacturing
m 0.1542 -0.0757 0.3387
(0.1215) (0.1163) (0.0394)
m 0.1760 -0.0977 0.0042
(0.1162) (0.1566) (0.0307)
r]M 0.7289 0.5648 0.6118
(0.0636) (0.0997) (0 .0 2 2 1 )
vn / h + m ^H 0.9544 0.5339 1.0848
(0.4059) (0.6049) (0.2355)
Jl 790 1065 1 2 1 0 0
J2 0.7078 0.0027 0.2742
Note: The standard-error is in the parenthesis. The regression (1.13) is
AlnFi)t =AlnAi)_9o +  Aku4i)9i_ +  r)jtN(AlnHijt +  AlnNitt) +  7]jtKA\nKitt- i  
+  r)jyM AlnMiit +  (rijiNfj,H +  Vj,KUj,H) AinHiit +  error,
The industry-specific time-dummies, AlnA^-go and Aln-A^gi-, are omitted in the table. J\ 
is the J-statistic for the over-identifying restriction test. J2 is the p-value for the Wald-test 
of the constant returns to scale in production, i.e. tjn +  t]k +  Vm =  1- The firm, sector, time 
indexes i , j , t  are omitted in the table.
Table 1.3: Regression coefficients of (1.13): Quality-adjusted worker-hours
Heavy Light Non
-manufacturing -manufacturing -manufacturing
m 0.1751 -0.0487 0.1979
(0.1263) (0.1238) (0.0557)
m 0.1561 -0.0995 -0.1475
(0 .1 1 0 1 ) (0.1639) (0.0392)
T]M 0.715 0.5492 0.4181
(0.062) (0 .1 0 1 ) (0.0255)
+ Vk uh 0.9512 0.5965 -0.0382
(0.4036) (0.6168) (0.3586)
Jl 757 1 0 2 2 12766
J2 0.7620 0.0039 0.0000
Note: See the note for Table 1 .2 .
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Table 1.4: Regression coefficients of (1.20)
Heavy Light Non
-manufacturing -manufacturing -manufacturing
7 0.8244 0.4653 0.4788
(0.0412) (0.0742) (0.0421)
Vk / ( p&k ) -0.1308 -0.0467 -0.0167
(0.0338) (0.0449) (0.0150)
J i 1150.8 1006.3 2631.4
J2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Note: The standard-error is in the parenthesis. The regression (1.20) is
Alnli,* =A lnA i)_ 9o +  AlnAii9i_  +  7jAlnM iit +  j^ -K [Aln(Pj)iit Jitt) -  A\n(PM,i,tMiit)] +  error.
Pjaj,K
The industry-specific time-dummies, AlnA^-go and AlnA^gi-, are omitted in the table. J\ 
is the J-statistic for the over-identifying restriction test. J2  is the p-value for the Wald-test of 
the constant returns to scale in production, i.e. 7 = 1 . The firm, sector, time indexes i , j , t  
are omitted in the table.
Table 1.5: Average TFP growth rates (%)
All the sectors Manufacturing Non
-manufacturing
Regression (1.13)
(Quality-unadjusted
worker-hours)
1980-1990 1.32 3.45 0.19
1990-1998 0.54 - 0.03 0.94
Regression (1.13) 
(Quality-adjusted 
worker-hours)
1980-1990 3.89 3.65 4.02
1990-1998 1.23 - 0 .0 2 1.95
Regression (1.20) 1980-1990 3.85 5.22 3.06
1990-1998 0.69 -0.06 1.37
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Figure 1.1: Total working-hours per worker, (2000=100.)
All industries Manufacturing |
130
125
120
115
110
105
100
Note: The data for all the industries are only available from 1970.
Figure 1.2: Working-days per year (days.)
All industries Manufacturing 1
300
290
280
270
260
250
240
230
220
210
200
Note: The data for all the industries are only available from 1970.
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Figure 1.3: Average working-hours of a worker per day (hours.)
All Industries Manufacturing
8.8
8.6
8.2
7.8
7.6
7.4
Note: The data for all the industries are only available from 1970.
Figure 1.4: Average over-time of a worker per day (hours.)
All Industries -o- Manufacturing]
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
Note: The data for all the industries are only available from 1970.
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Chapter 2
Firm  Dynam ics, Bankruptcy  
Laws and Total Factor 
P roductivity
A bstract
This chapter analyzes how legal restriction on liquidating collateral assets inter­
acts with a productivity slowdown in an economy with credit market frictions 
and heterogeneous productivity levels across the producers. We find that the 
legal restriction mitigates the downward fluctuation of the TFP level at the on­
set of the productivity slowdown, but also tha t a shock to the legal restriction 
endogenously deepens the productivity slowdown. We analyze entry and exit 
of the producers, and show that the low-productive producers start remaining 
in production under the productivity slowdown. We discuss implication of the 
model for the long stagnation in Japan after 1990.
2.1 Introduction
As estimated in the previous chapter, the productivity slowdown was one of 
the features of the long stagnation in Japan after 1990. Hayashi and Prescott 
(2002) estimate that the total factor productivity (TFP) growth rate dropped 
from 3.7% in the 1983-1990 period to 0.3% in the 1990-2000 period. While 
they do not control for fluctuation of unobserved capacity utilization and non-
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constant returns to scale in production, the previous chapter estimates that the 
average TFP growth rate dropped from 1.32% in the 1980-1990 period to 0.54% 
in the 1990-1998 period, controlling for these two factors. Figures 2.1 and 2.2 
show the level and the growth rate of TFP measured by the Solow residual.
The observed productivity slowdown was accompanied with the prolonged 
non-performing loans problem in the banking sector. Figure 2.3 shows that 
the loan write-offs by the banks became large only from the mid 1990’s, and 
remained persistently high after that, despite the fact tha t the non-performing 
loans problem had originated in real-estate related lending made in the late 
1980’s.1 One of the reasons behind the continuing loan losses was the declining 
collateral values due to the large fall of the land price.2 This implies that the 
banks did not liquidate loans and collateral assets as quickly as the decline of 
the land price. Figure 2.4 shows the declining real land price index in Japan in 
the 1990’s.
One of the reasons for the slow liquidation of the collateral assets was the 
mortgage laws.3 Until recently, there had been strong protection of the borrow­
ers’ collateral assets against foreclosure by the lenders. They were regarded as an 
impediment in the economy4 and led to the revision of the laws in 2003. In fact, 
the slow liquidation of the collateral assets also matches with the analysis of the 
Japanese economy before 1990. The analysis highlighted the soft approach of the 
Japanese banks toward financially distressed firms, which let the firms continue 
their operation.5 The restriction on liquidating collateral assets would induce 
the banks to take such a soft approach, because the restriction would prevent 
the banks from swiftly terminating the operation of the financially distressed 
firms.
A natural question that arises is how this feature of the credit market would
1See Hoshi (2001) for an empirical analysis of the origin of the non-performing loans prob­
lem.
2See Bank of Japan (2002) for an analysis on the causes of the new loan losses of the banks.
3 As another explanation, recent works argue that the banks extended loans to inefficient 
defaulting firms in the non-performing loans problem, and that the efficiency of the economy 
was impaired. See Hosono and Sakuragawa (2003), Peek and Rosengren (2003) and Caballero, 
Hoshi, and Kashyap (2004). This issue will be also analyzed in this paper .
4Ministry of Justice issued a report on this problem in 2002; ” A supplementary note for the 
interim proposal for the Law to Revise a Part of the Civil Laws for a Reform of the Mortgage 
and Civil Execution System.” See appendix for more detail of the mortgage laws.
5Corbett (1987), Sheard (1994) and Hoshi and Kashyap (2001, Ch.5) contain empirical 
surveys and case studies of the Japanese main-bank system.
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interact with the productivity slowdown. In this paper, we answer this question 
by constructing a general-equilibrium model with the legal restriction on liqui­
dating collateral assets. To analyze the transactions in the credit market, we 
need to consider a heterogeneous agents model. This is because homogeneous 
agents do not have any need for exchange with each other, including credit 
transactions. Hence, our analysis of the productivity slowdown departs from 
Hayashi and Prescott (2002), which analyze the effect of an exogenous aggre­
gate productivity slowdown in the representative agent model.6 In the class of 
the heterogeneous agents models, we focus on heterogeneity of the productivity 
levels across the agents. This choice is motivated by the considerable evidence 
that there occurred distortions in the resource allocation across the firms behind 
the productivity slowdown in the 1990’s.7 We model the autoregressive produc­
tivity transition process of each agent similar to the empirical firm dynamics, 
and analyze the resource allocation across the agents with different productivity 
levels.
To analyze the effect of the legal restriction on liquidating collateral assets, 
we model the collateralized debt contracts in the credit market assuming that 
the agents can only pledge to repay their debts up to the collateral values of 
their assets in the model. This assumption follows Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). 
Focusing on the collateralized debt contracts is important for the analysis of the 
Japanese economy, because collateralized loans are one of the features of the 
Japanese credit market, and caused the loan losses to the banking sector in the 
1990’s through the fall of the collateral value of the assets.
Using this model, we find two types of the effects of the legal restriction 
on liquidating collateral assets. One is the ex-post effect. When a negative 
productivity shock hits the economy, then the asset price falls, which reduces the 
asset value owned by the producers. This causes debt-overhang of the producers, 
and induces the lenders to liquidate their assets. This is a resource shift from 
the more-productive agents to the less-productive in the economy, because those
6Barseghyan (2002) and Dekle and Kletzer (2003) also provide general equilibrium analysis 
of the Japanese stagnation. Both consider the effect of the government forbearance in the 
non-performing loans problem in the banking sector. Barseghyan introduces the accumulation 
of non-performing loans by the insolvent banks in the standard overlapping generation model, 
and Dekle and Kletzer do so in the infinite-horizon representative agent model.
7Saita and Sekine (2001), Miyagawa (2003) and Nakakuki, Otani and Shiratsuka (2004).
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who borrow and engage in production are the more-productive. The restriction 
on liquidating collateral assets mitigates this resource shift after the negative 
productivity shock, and prevents a sharp fall of the TFP level of the economy 
due to the biased resource allocation across the producers. On the flip side of 
the coin, hampering the liquidation of the producers’ collateral assets increases 
the loan losses that the lenders suffer after the shock. This result matches with 
the observation in Japan such that the decline of the TFP level was not sharp 
in the early 1990’s, while the loan losses accounted by the banks became large 
in the 1990’s.
The other effect of the legal restriction on liquidating collateral assets is the 
ex-ante effect. The restriction reduces the collateral value of the assets and the 
borrowing limit of the agents. This prevents the more-productive agents in the 
economy from accumulating the production resources at their hands through 
borrowing. Then, the TFP level of the economy falls. This effect is important 
to understand the effect of the judicial precedents of the supreme court cases in 
1989 and 1991 that strengthened the legal restriction on liquidating collateral 
assets.8 Such a legal shock to the credit market causes the level-down effect 
on the TFP trend, and an endogenous productivity slowdown in the transition 
to the new trend. Also, by this level-down effect on TFP, the asset price falls 
after the shock, which induces default of the producers. Hence, the legal shock 
causes the endogenous productivity slowdown, the fall of the asset price, and the 
loan losses to the lenders. This result implies that the legal shock to the credit 
market helps to explain the feature of the Japanese economy in the 1990’s.
We also find that the ex-ante effect of the legal restriction on liquidating col­
lateral assets is important to understand the effect of an increase in the produc­
tivity heterogeneity in the economy. Fukao and Kwon (2004) find the increases 
of the persistence of each firm’s productivity level and the productivity gap 
across the firms over the 1990’s in the panel data of the Japanese manufacturing 
firms. Our model implies that such a shock to the productivity dynamics lets 
the more-productive agents have more time to accumulate net-worth by keeping 
investing into their high-productive production. This shifts the resource alloca­
8Yamazaki, Seshimo, Ohta and Sugihara (2005) point out this fact. See appendix for more 
detail.
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tion toward them, and raises the TFP level of the economy. However, the legal 
restriction on liquidating collateral assets reduces the borrowing limit and the 
leverage the agents can take. This curbs the positive effects of the shock on 
the net-worth accumulation of the more-productive producers and on the TFP 
level. This result implies that the legal restriction prevented the increase in 
the productivity heterogeneity across the firms from mitigating the productivity 
slowdown in Japan after 1990. Over all, our model implies that the legal restric­
tion mitigated the downward fluctuation of the TFP level at the onset of the 
productivity slowdown, but endogenously deepened the productivity slowdown 
over time in the long stagnation in Japan.
In the analysis of the productivity slowdown described above, we investigate 
the effect of entry and exit of the agents in production. This is important, be­
cause some researchers find that low-productive ’’zombie firms” were financed by 
the lenders and remained in production, which worsened the productivity slow­
down in the 1990’s.9 We show that the low-productive producers start remaining 
in production under the productivity slowdown, because the productivity slow­
down lowers the input prices more than the productivity levels under the credit 
market frictions,10 and then raises the rate of return to investment for each pro­
ducer. Hence, it becomes viable for the low-productive producers to remain in 
production.11
Besides the results described so far, we also investigate the cause of the 
decline of the firms’ borrowing in the 1990’s. One possible reason for the decline 
of the borrowing is that the low rates of return to investment induced the firms 
to avoid taking risk of debt-overhang and reduce their borrowing.12 Another
9Kobayashi, Saita, and Sekine (2002), Hosono and Sakuragawa (2003), Peek and Rosengren 
(2003), and Caballero, Hoshi, and Kashyap (2004).
10Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) find this propagation mechanism.
11 The effect of the restriction on liquidating collateral assets on the entry and exit of the 
producers is that under the exogenous aggregate productivity slowdown, the restriction mit­
igates the downward fluctuation of the TFP level and the fall of the input prices after the 
shock. Then, it prevents the low-productive producers from remaining in production as well. 
The intensified restriction endogenously causes the productivity slowdown and the stay of the 
low-productive producers in production.
12Motonishi and Yoshikawa (1999) explain the decline of the firms’ investment and borrowing 
by the decline of their demand for the capital stock. However, Hayashi and Prescott (2002) 
report that the firms continued financing investment by their internal reserves in the 1990’s 
despite cutting back the amount of borrowing. The risk of debt-overhang can explain this 
observation such that the low rates of return to investment induced the firms to avoid taking 
risk of the ex-post debt-overhang and refrain from borrowing.
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explanation for the decline of the firms’ borrowing is tha t the fall of the collateral 
value of the assets reduced the borrowing limit of the firms, and constrained 
their borrowing. To address this question, we consider possible debt-overhang 
by delay of production to analyze the risk-taking behavior of the agents, and 
investigate the change of their credit demand under the productivity slowdown. 
We find that because the productivity slowdown reduces the input prices more 
proportionally than the productivity level of each agent, each agent has the 
higher rate of return to investment, and becomes more inclined to borrow up 
to the limit. Consequently, the potential credit demand of the agents increases. 
However, the productivity slowdown reduces the asset price and the collateral 
value of the assets. This reduces the agents’ borrowing. Therefore, our analysis 
suggests that the fall of the collateral value of the assets caused the decline of 
the firms’ borrowing in the 1990’s, rather than the risk-averse behavior of the 
firms.
Related to this result, we find that the more-productive producers become 
more fragile to the unexpected fall of the asset price than the less-productive 
producers, because the more-productive producers borrow more. This analysis 
indicates the mechanism behind the observation that the more-productive firms 
exit from production, while the less-productive firms stay in production in the 
1990’s.13
Theoretically, this chapter is related to the literature that analyzes the effect 
of policies and institutions on the TFP level of the economy. In this literature, 
Caselli and Gennaioli (2002) is the most closely related work to this chapter. 
They analyze the effect of credit market frictions on the T FP level of the economy 
through letting inefficient family members inherit the firms. Our contribution 
is to analyze the TFP effect of the credit market frictions under various shocks 
to the deep parameters of the economy.
This chapter also adds to the recent literature on the general equilibrium 
analysis of bankruptcy laws. Bolton and Rosenthal (2002) and Biais and Mar- 
iotti (2003) are among the preceding works. They analyze the effect of the 
bankruptcy laws on the resource allocation across the agents, considering liq­
13Nishimura, Kiyota and Nakajima (2003), and Fukao and Kwon (2004) analyze the case in 
Japan in the 1990’s. Barlevy (2003) analyzes a similar observation over the business cycles in 
United States.
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uidity shocks. Our contribution is to analyze this effect in the heterogeneous 
agents model with different productivity levels, and to specify its effect on the 
level and the growth of TFP in the economy.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.2 describes the 
model. Section 2.3 shows the dynamic responses to structural changes in the 
model. Section 2.4 analyzes the mechanism of the decline of the firm’s borrow­
ing under the productivity slowdown. Section 2.5 discusses implication of the 
analysis for the long stagnation in Japan. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 M odel
Consider a discrete-time economy with homogeneous and perishable goods and 
a continuum of agents. Each agent is risk-neutral, and maximizes the following 
utility function:
where i is the index for each agent, and Cj)S is consumption at date s. (3 E (0,1) 
is the discount factor for future utility, and Et denotes expectation formed at 
date t.
The factor of production in the economy is land. If an agent i invests li>t 
units of land into production at date t, then she harvests the amount A^tl^t of 
goods at date t + 1. A i)t is the productivity level which the agent knows when 
she invests the land into production at date t. After the harvest, the agent can 
start new production.
A ift changes over time for each agent i. After the production, she receives 
a stochastic shock to determine her productivity level for the next production. 
The productivity transition follows an autoregressive process such that
ln (^i,f) — gt + p\n{A^t-i)  +  €i,t, p £ (0,1), ~  i.i.d.Af(0, a2). (2.2)
g is the exogenous productivity growth rate, p is the autoregressive coefficient. 
g and p are constant and common to all the agents, p E (0,1) implies that the 
productivity level is persistent. e^t is the idiosyncratic productivity shock to 
each agent. Hereafter, we omit the agent index i to simplify the notation.
Ci,i
s= t
(2.1)
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The production technology is specific to each agent. Once an agent has 
invested land into production, only she has the necessary skill to obtain the full 
returns from the production at the next date. This assumption implies that in 
the credit contract, the lending agent (the lender) can seize only the land of 
the borrowing agent (the borrower-producer), if the borrower-producer does not 
cooperate and defaults. We assume that the agents cannot collectively punish 
the defaulting borrower-producer by excluding her from the credit market, and 
that the defaulting borrower-producer can borrow from a new lender without 
any default record and start new production. We also assume tha t the borrower- 
producer has a strong bargaining power against the lender, and can reduce 
the amount of the repayment of the borrowing down to the collateral value 
of the land for the lender by renegotiating the contract between the timings 
of the land-investment and the harvest. Anticipating this, the lender lends to 
the borrower-producer only up to the collateral value of the land. Thus, the 
pledgeable repayment of the borrowing by the borrower-producer is constrained
by
bt+i < EtVt+ik- (2-3)
bt+1 is the repayment of the borrowing by the borrower-producer at date t + 1, 
and vt+i is the collateral value per unit of land then.
Note that it is the expected value of vt+\ that determines the borrowing 
limit of the borrower-producer, rather than the realized value. To obtain (2.3), 
we assume that the borrower-producer must work using her specific skill before 
knowing the shock to the economy, and can renegotiate the credit contract only 
before then. This assumption implies the credit contract becomes the debt 
contract. This will m atter when we analyze the effect of unexpected shocks in 
the next section.14
To specify the collateral value of land, we assume that the laws in this econ­
omy allow the lender to liquidate only a fraction 6 (e  [0,1]) of the defaulting
14The reason of our focus on collateralized debt contracts is that they are a prominent 
feature of the Japanese credit market, which had led to the non-performing loans problem by 
the large decline of the collateral value of land after 1990. Modeling collateral lending, we will 
analyze how the legal restriction on liquidating collateral assets would affect the aggregate 
production later. The motivation for this analysis is that the Japanese mortgage laws have 
been restrictive against foreclosure of collateral assets, as described in appendix.
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borrower’s land every date. Implicitly, we assume that the laws and the court 
system are inefficient, and do not allow swift foreclosure of the collateral land by 
the lender. The unliquidated fraction of the collateral land remains at disposal 
of the borrower until the next date. Then, the lender can liquidate the fraction 
9 of the remaining collateral land again.15 Under this assumption, the collateral 
value of a unit of the collateral land for the lender is16
Vt — 0qt +  Et
(1 -  0)0qt+ 1 + = eqt + (1 -  *) (2.4)
1 + rt1 +  rt
qt is the land price at date t, and rt is the interest rate for the borrowing made 
at date t. We assume that the interest rate is competitively determined in the 
credit market, and taken as given by the agents.17
2.2.1 A g en t’s behavior
Under these assumptions, the agent’s optimization problem at date t is defined 
as
max Et ( )  (2.5)
\  S = t  /
s.t. cs +  qa(la lg—j) — A s—\lg—\ bg + - S + l
+ r3
bs+i EgVg+ilg
Is ^  0.
cs is consumption, la is the land invested into the next production, and ba is 
the amount of debt-repayment at date s. If ba is negative, it is the return to 
the lending of the agent. ra is the interest rate, q3 is the land price, and v3 is
15 This assumption about the partial liquidation reflects a difference between the mortgage 
laws and the bankruptcy laws, such that the mortgage laws themselves do not reduce the 
borrower’s liabilities, and ultimately allow full-liquidation of collateral assets by the lenders 
after possible delays. The result of the model would be applicable to the effect of bankruptcy 
laws, as long as they reduce the liabilities of the borrowers and restrict ex-post liquidation of 
collateral assets by the lenders.
16vt would be the market price of the mortgage right to liquidate a unit of the borrower- 
producer’s collateral land, if the lender sold it to the other agents. Also in each date, the 
timing of the events is as follows: the harvest of the production, transactions in the land 
and the credit markets including liquidation of land, and investment of land into production. 
Thus, the liquidated land is sold to the other agents and invested into production.
17Note that the borrower-producers gain the strong bargaining power against the lenders 
only after making investment. The interest rate is competitively determined in the credit 
market before they borrow from the lenders and invest into production.
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the collateral value of a unit of land at date s. The agent takes the current 
and expected future values of qs, rs and vs as given. As_! is the productivity 
level of the investment made at the previous date. The first constraint is the 
flow-of-funds constraint. The second constraint is the borrowing constraint. 
The third constraint is the non-negativity constraint for consumption and the 
land-investment.
The expectation is taken for the future values of qs, rs and v3, and the 
productivity levels in the future, given the productivity level for the current 
investment, A*. We assume that the agents form rational expectation. As 
the productivity transition shocks to the agents are idiosyncratic, there is no 
aggregate uncertainty, and we can replace the expected future values of qa, rs 
and vs with the realized values in the economy.
We solve the optimization problem (2.5) by calculating the shadow value of 
the net-worth by the Lagrange multiplier. The agent chooses the behavior that 
provides the highest shadow value of the net-worth, given the predetermined 
amount of the net-worth. See appendix for more detail of the optimization.
We can show that the agent’s consumption, borrowing (lending), and invest­
ment depend on the level of A t such th a t18
(ct) hi bt+i) —
( 0, + , E tvt+1lt ) if A t e  (A f, oo). (Borrower-producers.)
( 0, 0, — ) if A t £ (A f, A f ). (Lender-savers.) (2.6)
( +> 0> 0 ) ifA * E (0 ,A f). (Consumers.)
A f > A t . A f is the lower-bound of the productivity level to engage in produc-
 Q
tion. A t is the upper-bound to consume their net-worth. The marginal agents 
with A t = A f are indifferent between investment and lending, and those with
A t = A t are indifferent between lending and consumption. 19
18We numerically show this under the parameter values calibrated for the Japanese economy 
which we will specify later.
19Their behavior can be written as
/ 7 l \ / (  0) +> < Etvt+iIt ) if At =  At .(<*, h, 6<+i) = | ( > 0j 0> } i { A t= 7 c
The ranges in the brackets imply that the agent is indifferent to the corresponding variable in 
the specified range.
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(2.6) only specifies the signs of Ct, lt and bt+\ for some cases. The values of 
such variables are determined so as to satisfy the flow-of-funds constraint such 
that
h = if A t 6 Cdf, 00). (2.7)
1+rt
bs+i =  — (1 +  r s)(i4s_i/s_i +  qsls- i — bs) if A t G (A t , A f) .  (2.8) 
ca — A a- i la- i  +  qala~i — ba if A t G (0, A t ). (2-9)
The intuition for the agents’ behavior in (2.6) is tha t when an agent has a 
sufficiently high productivity level (> A f) ,  she finds the production cost implied 
by the interest rate and the land price relatively cheap, compared to the high rate 
of return to her investment. Then, she engages in production, and borrows up 
to the limit to invest as much as possible. If an agent has a medium productivity 
level ( g (A t ,.A f)), then she does not find it profitable to invest into production, 
and exit from or does not enter production. But she expects to become high- 
productive in the near future, and saves her net-worth to invest into production
 Q
then. If an agent has a low productivity level (<  A t ), then she expects to 
remain low-productive for the future, because the productivity level is persistent 
as assumed by the productivity transition process (2.2). Because she discounts 
future consumption, she finds it optimal to consume all the net-worth at her 
hand immediately, rather than waiting for becoming high-productive.20
Over all, the agents determine their behavior by comparing the rates of return 
to investment and lending, and the marginal utility of consumption. Because 
the rates of return to investment and lending depend on the current and future 
interest rates and land prices, the levels of A f and A t depend on these prices. 
We can show that A f  satisfies
A f  = (1 +  rt)qt -  qt+1. (2.10)
20(2.6) implies that if the agents consume, the agents make no investment or lending, so 
that their net-worth at the next date is zero. Given the borrowing constraint, the flow-of- 
funds constraint implies that such agents cannot do any economic activity without net-worth 
from the next-date. Hence, consumption is endogenous exit from the economy. To keep the 
population of the economically-active agents in the economy positive, we assume there are 
new-entrants into the economy every date with arbitrarily small amount of net-worth. Hence, 
the equilibrium obtained above is the limit case when we take the new-entrants’ net-worth to 
the limit at zero in the model. We consider the limit case to simplify the analysis, as generally 
the net-worth of the new firms is not large in the data, compared to the incumbents.
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Hence, the marginal producer’s productivity level is equal to the cost of holding
—Cland for a period. See appendix for the implicit function to determine A t .
In (2.6), there appear the two state variables of the agent; A t and the net- 
worth. A t affects the type of the agent’s behavior, and the net-worth affects the 
amount of the investment, the lending, or the consumption through the flow-of- 
funds constraint of the agent as shown in (2.7)-(2.9). This is because the agent 
decides the levels of her investment, lending and consumption by comparing the 
expected rates of return to investment and lending with the marginal utility of 
consumption. The linear utility function (2.1) makes the marginal utility unity,
independent of the consumption level. Also, because the production function is
linear to the land-investment, and the interest rate is taken as given, the rates 
of return to investment and lending are independent of the levels of investment 
and lending. Therefore, the choice of the levels of investment, lending and 
consumption becomes discrete such as spending all the net-worth on one of 
the three types of the actions and nothing on the others, depending on the 
productivity level of the agent.
2.2.2 Equilibrium  conditions
Now, we consider the market clearing conditions of the land and the credit 
markets. Given the agent’s behavior specified above, we can obtain the land 
market clearing condition as
poo
/  Lt (at)dat = 1, (2-11)
where
a t = ln(A^). (2.12)
The definitions of a f  and o f ,  respectively, are l n ( A f ) and In(At ). Lt (at) is 
the land-investment distribution function at date t. The left-hand side of the 
equation is the aggregate land demand, and the right-hand side is the aggre­
gate supply. We assume that the supply of land in the economy is fixed and 
normalized to be 1.
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The credit market clearing condition is
r  S t(oct)doct =  f ° °  Lt(at)dat. (2.13)
Jaf  l  + rt JgP
S t(at) is the lending distribution function at date t. The left-hand side of the 
equation is the aggregate lending, and the right-hand side is the aggregate bor­
rowing.
To specify the aggregate land demand and the aggregate lending, we need 
to obtain the land-investment and the lending distribution functions L t(at) and 
St (at). To do so, we first aggregate the flow-of-funds constraint of the optimiza­
tion problem (2.5) to obtain the aggregate net-worth such that
poo
Wt(at) = /  (exp(at_i) + qt -  £t-iV t)Lt_ i(a t_ i ) / ( a t |a t_ i)dat_i
o^p
+  [  (1 +  rt-i)St-i(ott-i)f(oLt\°tt-\)doLt-i, (2-14)
M -1
where
/{ a t |a ,- i ) = v f c exp { J a t - 9t2; r - i ] )  • (2-15)
Wt(at) is the aggregate net-worth distribution function at date t. f ( a t 
is the conditional probability to have a* given a t~ i, which is defined by the 
productivity transition process (2.2).
From the aggregate net-worth, we can obtain the land-investment and the 
lending distribution functions as21
W % - J W ( l  +  r,) (2-16)
St(at) = Wt(at) for a t e  [of, o f) . (2.17)
Given the parameters of the model (/?, g , p , cr, 6), and the initial values
and functions of a ^ ,  E - iVq, L_i(a;_i) and (1 +  r_i)5_i(o;_i), we define 
equilibrium as
• {cs, lSJ 6s+ i} ^ 0 solve the optimization problem (2.5), given the current and 
future prices {ga, r a, Consequently, { o f, a f} £ i0 are derived;
21In (2.16) and (2.17), we assume the marginal producers with o;t_i = a [ _ 1 borrow up to 
the limit. This is valid, as this is weakly optimal for these agents, and their size in the economy 
is zero. The similar argument holds for the marginal lenders with c c t - i  =
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• {Ls(as), S s(as)}fL0 are recursively determined by (2.14)-(2.17), given {q3, 
ra, E avs+1 , a f , o f  }£i0, and the initial values and functions;
•  {<7s> rs, va}^o are determined in order to satisfy the market clearing con­
ditions (2.11) and (2.13), given the definition of vs in (2.4);
• the agents form rational expectation about the future prices {qs,rs, us}£Lf+1 
at every date £;
• there is no bubble in the land price, so that at every date t ,
The goods market clears in equilibrium by Walras’ Law.
As described above, the productivity transition shocks to the agents are 
idiosyncratic, and there is no aggregate uncertainty in the economy. By the 
rational expectation, we can replace the expected values of the future prices 
with the realized values in equilibrium.
2.3 Dynam ic analysis
2.3.1 D efin ition  o f T F P  and th e renegotiation  o f the debts 
after unexpected  shocks
Using this model, we analyze how changes of the parameter values affect the 
land allocation and the average productivity in the economy measured by total 
factor productivity (TFP). TFP is the average productivity of the aggregate 
factors of production. To define TFP in our model, we first derive the aggregate 
output at date t as
As the land is the sole factor of production in our model, we define TFP by 
dividing the aggregate output by the supply of land in the economy. Because 
the supply of land is fixed to be 1, TFP coincides with the aggregate output;
(2.19)
T F P t = Yt . (2.20)
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(2.19) and (2.20) imply that TFP is the weighted average of the individual 
productivity levels of the producers.
In the following analysis, we consider the dynamic response of the economy 
to unexpected shocks. In some cases, the land price declines so much that the 
output and the asset value owned by the borrower-producer become smaller than 
the value of her debt after the shock. In this case, the lender can take all the 
borrower-producer’s output, and liquidate her land up to the fraction 6. This is 
implied by the assumption above such that the borrower-producer has worked for 
production with her specific skill before knowing the shock to the economy. After 
the shock, the lender does not need cooperation from the borrower-producer 
to produce the output, and can fully enforce the debt repayment up to the 
legal restriction on liquidating the collateral assets. Over the unpaid debt with 
the unliquidated fraction of the land, the lender and the borrower-producer 
renegotiate. W ithout cooperation of the borrower-producer, the lender would 
be able to only gradually liquidate the land from the next date under the legal 
restriction on liquidating collateral assets. In this case, the payoff to the lender 
at the next date t -1-1 would be E tvt+i per unit of the unliquidated fraction of 
the land. By the strong bargaining power of the borrower-producer, we assume 
that the borrower-producer can reduce the repayment for the unpaid debt at 
the next date down to this value in the renegotiation. This assumption implies 
that if the size of the unliquidated fraction of the land is (1 — 9)lt- \  at date t , 
then the lender rolls over the amount E t [vt+ i/( l  -f r t)](1 — 6)k -1  of the debt, 
and writes off the rest of the unpaid debt. We assume that all the lenders in the 
economy suffer from the loan losses at the same rate to their lending after the 
unexpected shock.22
2.3.2 Effect o f restricting collateral liquidation under an 
aggregate productivity  slowdown
In this subsection, we analyze how different levels of the legal restriction on 
liquidating collateral assets affect the dynamics of the economy under an exoge­
22Implicitly, we can consider that the banks intermediate between the borrower-producers 
and the lenders without any cost, and they equally apply the loan losses to the deposits of the 
lenders.
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nous aggregate productivity slowdown. This analysis is related to Hayashi and 
Prescott (2002), which analyze the effect of the aggregate productivity slow­
down in the standard exogenous growth model for the long stagnation in Japan 
after 1990. We extend their analysis by taking into account the slow liquida­
tion of collateral assets in the Japanese credit market. We especially highlight 
the Japanese mortgage laws, which had been restrictive against foreclosure of 
the collateral land and ended up with the reform in 2003. We investigate how 
such legal restriction on liquidating collateral assets would interact with the 
productivity slowdown.
We consider an unexpected permanent decline of g at date 0, and numeri­
cally compute the dynamics of the model after the shock, g is the exogenous 
productivity growth rate common to all the agents. We adopt the base-line 
parameter values in Table 2.1, and the change of g in Table 2.2. We choose 
the base-line parameter values by matching the steady-state values in the model 
with the Japanese macro and micro data before the productivity slowdown af­
ter 1990. For existence of the steady state, we can show that there exists a 
balanced-growth path with the growth rate exp(g /(l — p)).
Table 2.1: The base-line parameter values for numerical calculation.
p 9 P <7 e
0.9510 0.0076 0.614 0.0797 0.1
Table 2.2: The experiment 1
An unexpected permanent shock to g at date 0 0.0076 -► 0.0058
In Table 2.1, the values of p and a are taken from Fukao and Kwon (2004)’s 
estimation of the productivity transition process (2.2) for the Japanese manu­
facturing firms in the 1990’s. We use the estimates of p and a  for their earliest 
subsample period in the 1990’s.23 Then, we choose the value of g to match the 
long-run TFP growth rate in the model, exp(g/[l — /?]) — 1, with 1.98%, which 
was the average TFP growth rate for 1975-1990.24 The benchmark values of (3
23It is 1994-1997. Ideally, we should use the estimates for the 1980’s, but their panel data 
only start from 1994.
24This is measured by the Solow residual. The estimate is different from Hayashi and
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and 6 are chosen to match the interest rate and the collateralizable fraction of 
the current land value25 with 5% and 77% a t  the steady state, given the other 
base-line parameter values. 5% is the average real interest rate in the early 
1980’s. We choose this period because of the oil shocks in the 1970’s and the 
asset-price bubble in the late 1980’s. For the collateralizable fraction of the cur­
rent land value, several banks issue their policies on this fraction in their annual 
reports. In many cases, their fractions are 60%. The Finacial Service Agency 
also announces the guideline for their inspectation of the banks’ balance sheets, 
and set 70% as the healthy collateralizable fraction of the current land value. I 
choose 0 = 0.1 to match with the conservative estimate of the collateralizable 
fraction, 77%. In Table 2.2, we choose the change of g to make the long-run TFP 
growth rate decline from 1.98% to 0.95%. 0.95% is the average TFP growth rate 
in Japan for 1990-1998.26
We assume that the economy is at the steady state before the shock at date 
0. When we numerically compute the dynamics of the model after the shock, we 
calculate the equilibrium sequence of {gs, r s, a f  , which converges to the
new steady state under the new value of g. In the iteration to find this sequence, 
we compute the distribution functions Lt(ott) and St{cxt) by approximating the 
integral in (2.14) by Gaussian-quadrature. See appendix for more detail of the 
computation.
Figure 2.5 shows the dynamics of T F P t , qt and rt. To show the dynamics of 
the economy under different levels of 6, we choose high, middle and low values 
of 9, which are 1, 0.5 and 0.1, respectively.27 First, the land price immediately 
drops after the shock, as the agents in the economy form rational expectation
Prescott (2002). This is because they use GNP as the output and include the capital stock 
oversea owned by Japanese. Here, we use GDP and the domestic capital stock in the calcula­
tion.
25For example, the collateralizable fraction of the current land price is 50%, if you can borrow 
$5000 against the collateral land worth $10000 at the current market value. In our model, 
this fraction is given by [u*+i/(l +  rt )]/qt■ We can show that this is 0 /{( 1 +  rt ) /exp(g/[l  -  
p]) — (1 — 0 )} at the steady state.
26This figure is measured by the Solow residual. We use the data of the 1968 Standard 
of the National Account. The sample period ends in 1998, because the government changed 
the standard of the data in this year. Some data necessary to calculate the Solow residual 
is not available for the period before 1990 under the new standard. We choose to use the 
old standard to keep the consistency of the estimates of the TFP growth rates between the 
periods before and after 1990.
27The collateralizable fraction of the current land value under 9 =  1, 0.5 and 0.1, respectively, 
are around 97%, 95%, and 77% at the steady state.
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(and take into account that the productivity slowdown reduces the future land 
productivity. This reduces the asset value owned by the borrower-producers, and 
leads to their default. The enforcement of their debt repayments shifts the net- 
worth allocation to the lenders. Because the borrower-producers are the more- 
productive agents in the economy, this implies tha t the net-worth allocation is 
biased toward the less-productive agents. This shift of the net-worth allocation 
is accompanied with the shift of the land allocation to the less-productive agents. 
This is because the borrowing constraint prevents the borrower-producers from 
financing all the cost of purchasing land by borrowing, and requires them to 
make down-payments from their own net-worth.
The loss of the net-worth of the more-productive agents prevents them from 
buying as much land as before, and propagates the reduction of the land price. 
By this propagation, the cost of investment falls more proportionally than the de­
cline of the TFP level.28 This increases the rate of return to investment for each 
agent, which induces the less-productive agents to start engaging in production. 
Consequently, the threshold productivity level to engage in production, A f , is 
lowered, as shown in Figure 2.6. This change implies tha t even if an incumbent 
producer becomes low-productive by the productivity transition process (2.2), 
she does not exit from production. Similarly, the low-productive lenders start 
entering production.
The shift of the land allocation toward the less-productive producers causes 
an endogenous propagation of the exogenous productivity shock, and the tempo­
rary drop of the TFP level from the new long-run trend. Note that the borrowing 
constraint plays the important role in this endogenous decline of the TFP level 
as described above. If we considered a perfectly competitive market model like 
Hayashi and Prescott (2002), then the TFP trend would immediately kink after 
the shock without any temporary drop.
Over time, the more-productive agents recover the net-worth by the high 
rates of return to their investment, and accumulate land for their production. 
Then, the TFP level gradually returns to the new long-run trend.29 The real in­
28Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) find this mechanism. Our contribution is to find that this 
mechanism explains why the low-productive producers start remaining in production under 
the productivity slowdown.
29By this recovery, the TFP growth rate overshoots the new steady-state level after the
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terest rate falls because the decline of the future land price reduces the collateral 
value of land, and then the borrowing limit of the agents:
In the comparison across the different levels of 6, the lower the level of 6, 
the smaller the temporary drop of the TFP level from the new trend. This is 
because the lower value of 6 prevents the enforcement of the debt repayments 
after the decline of the land price. This lets the more-productive producers 
retain more net-worth, and mitigates the shift of the net-worth allocation to 
the less-productive agents. Figure 2.7 shows the net-worth distribution across 
the agents, and that the loss of the net-worth of the more-productive producers 
becomes less as 6 is lower. On the flip side of the coin, the lenders suffer from 
the larger loan losses as 0 is lower, as shown in Table 2.3.30
Table 2.3: The loan-loss rate at date 0 after the shock to g
e 1 0.5 0 .1
Loan-loss rate 21.82% 22.41% 25.69%
2.3.3 Effect o f intensified restriction  on collateral liqui­
dation
In this subsection, we analyze the dynamics of the economy after the legal re­
striction on liquidating collateral assets is intensified. The motivation for this 
analysis is the supreme court cases in 1989 and 1991, which strengthened the 
legal restriction on liquidating collateral assets. These cases reinforced the pro­
tection of the borrowers’ lease contracts on the collateral land and buildings, 
which would delay foreclosure of the collateral assets by the lenders.31 Using
sharp drop at date 0 .
30The loan losses at date 0 are caused by the unexpected decline of the land price. From 
date 0 onward, the agents rationally expect the future land prices, so that the lenders lend 
only up to the amounts under which they can avoid the borrowers’ default.
31Under the mortgage laws, foreclosure of collateral properties rescinds the lease contracts 
on the collateral properties, if the lender has set the mortgage right before the lease contracts. 
But until the reform in 2003, the laws had protected the preceded lease contracts against 
foreclosure for 3-5 years. One way to prevent the borrower from abusing this regulation was 
to have the lease contract between the borrower and the lender. However, the supreme court 
in 1989 denied the validity of such a contract unless there was actual use of the property by 
the lender. See appendix for more detail of the supreme court cases in 1989 and 1991.
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Table 2.4: The experiment 2
An unexpected permanent shock to 0 at date 0 0.1 -> 0.031
our general-equilibrium model, we analyze how the economy responds to such a 
legal shock, focusing on the level and the growth of TFP.
We consider an unexpected permanent decline of 6 at date 0 from 0.1 to
0.031. We use the base-line parameter values in Table 2.1 for the other pa­
rameters in the numerical calculation. This shock replicates that the average 
TFP growth rate dropped from 1.98% to 1.11% for 1990-1995 in Japan. Here, 
we consider the decline of the average TFP growth rate for 5 years after the 
shock rather than a decade, provided that the shock occurred in 1990. This 
is because the productivity slowdown under the shock to 6 is not permanent, 
as will be shown later. Instead, this exercise shows that the legal shock to the 
credit market endogenously causes a medium-term productivity slowdown. Even 
though 6 =  0.031 might seem too low, we can calculate that the corresponding 
collateralizable fraction of the land value is 51% at the steady state, given the 
other base-line parameter values in Table 2.1. This figure is not immediately 
unrealistic.
We assume that the economy is at the steady state before the shock at date 
0 , and calculate the equilibrium dynamics of the economy converging to the new 
steady state under the new value of 6. Figure 2.8 shows the dynamics of T F P t , 
qt and rt. The TFP level endogenously drops after the shock, and its trend 
also levels down. This is because the decline of 6 reduces the collateral value of 
land and the borrowing limit of the agents. This in turn limits the leverage the 
agents can take, and decreases the rates of return to unit net-worth invested by 
the borrower-producers. Therefore, their net-worth accumulation slows down. 
As they are the more-productive agents in the economy, consequently the land 
allocation shifts to the less-productive agents, which causes the level-down effect 
on the TFP level of the economy.
The land price responds to this level-down of the future land productivity, 
and immediately drops after the shock. This lowers the cost of investment. 
Then, it becomes viable for the less-productive agents to remain in and enter
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production after the shock, and the level of A.f declines, as shown in Figure 2.9. 
This entry and exit effect contributes to the endogenous level-down effect on the 
TFP level in the economy.
The real interest rate falls after the shock because of the reduced borrowing 
limit of the borrower-producers. This directly reduces the borrower-producers’ 
borrowing. Then, the real interest rate decreases to clear the credit market.
2.3.4 Com parison betw een the exogenous aggregate pro­
d u ctiv ity  slowdown and th e  endogenous slowdown  
under th e  intensified restriction  on liquidating col­
lateral assets
The main feature of the dynamics after the decline of 9 is similar to the case of 
the shock to g. Both of the shocks cause the declines of the TFP growth rate, 
the land price and the real interest rate. But there are differences as well. One 
of the differences between the two shocks is that the TFP level only gradually 
shifts to the new trend after the shock to 9, while it undershoots the new trend 
after the shock to g. This is because the decline of 9 only gradually shifts the 
land allocation to the less-productive agents by limiting the leverage the more- 
productive agents can take. Also, the decline of 9 lets the borrower-producers 
renegotiate the debt repayments at date 0  under the intensified restriction on 
liquidating collateral assets.32 This shifts the net-worth allocation to the more- 
productive agents at the impact of the shock to 9, as shown in Figure 2.10, and 
contributes to the slow shift of the land allocation to the less-productive agents 
after the shock. In contrast, under the shock to <7, the unexpected decline of 
the land price reduces the asset value owned by the borrower-producers, and the 
enforcement of their debt repayments immediately shifts the net-worth allocation 
to the less-productive agents at the impact of the shock. This in turn causes 
the immediate shift of the land allocation to the less-productive agents after the 
shock.
The gradual decline of the TFP level after the shock to 9 is transformed into 
the continuous stagnation of the TFP growth rate. In contrast, the fluctuation
32The loan-loss rate is 32.44%.
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of the TFP growth rate is larger under the decline of g. The TFP growth 
rate sharply declines after the shock to g, but quickly jumps up and overshoots 
the new long-run TFP growth rate. The overshooting of the TFP growth rate 
occurs, as the TFP level recovers from the initial drop to the new trend after 
the shock. ^
Note tha t the shock to g directly reduces the long-run TFP growth rate 
exp(p/[l — p]), which is implied by the productivity transition process (2 .2 ), 
while the shock to 0 causes the level-down of the TFP trend without affecting 
its long-run growth rate. Hence, the shock to g reduces the TFP level much 
larger than the shock to 6 in the long run. This is transformed into the larger 
decline of the land price after the shock to g than 9, for the given level of the 
decline in the TFP growth rate at the impact of the shock. This feature again 
indicates tha t the fluctuation of the economy after the shock is larger under the 
shock to g than 6.
2.3.5 Effect o f an increase in th e heterogeneity  o f the  
agen ts’ productiv ity  levels
In this subsection, we analyze the dynamics of the economy after an increase in 
the heterogeneity of the agents’ productivity levels. This is motivated by the 
empirical analysis of Fukao and Kwon (2004). They estimate the productivity 
transition process (2.2) for the Japanese manufacturing firms by the panel data 
in the 1990’s, and find that the level of p increased during the 1990’s, and that 
the productivity gap across the firms also increased. Given this observation, we 
analyze the effect of such a structural change of the firm dynamics and how the 
level of the legal restriction on liquidating collateral assets affects the effect.
We consider an unexpected permanent increase of p at date 0 from 0.614 
to 0.765. These values are estimated by Fukao and Kwon for 1994-1997 and 
1998-2001, respectively. The immediate effect of this change is an increase of 
the long-run growth rate of the economy exp(p/[l — p]). To analyze the level 
effect of the increase of p, we set g = 0. We use the base-line parameter values 
in Table 2.1 for the other parameters. We assume that the economy is at the 
steady state before the shock at date 0 , and calculate the equilibrium dynamics
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Table 2.5: The experiment 3
An unexpected permanent shock to p at date 0 under g = 0 0.614 -► 0.765
of the economy converging to the new steady state under the new value of p.
Figure 2.11 shows the dynamics of T F P t, qt and rt . The TFP level rises after 
the shock. This is because the more-productive agents become more likely to 
remain in production after the shock, and increase their net-worth accumulation 
through reinvesting their net-worth into their high-productive production. This 
shifts the land allocation toward the more-productive agents and raises the TFP 
level. The rise of the TFP level also raises the land price.
The real interest rate declines because the size of the lenders increases in 
the economy. The rise of the land price raises the cost of investment and then 
A f , as shown in Figure 2.12. Also, Aif decreases, because the more net-worth 
accumulation by the more-productive agents enhances the payoff for the less- 
productive agents to wait and lend their net-worth until they become high- 
productive and engage in production.
However, the comparison across the different levels of 6 shows that the lower 
the level of 0, the smaller the positive effect of an increase in p on the TFP 
level. This is shown by the TFP growth rate in Figure 2.11. The reason is that 
the lower level of 6 reduces the collateral value of land and limits the leverage 
the agents can take. This weakens the effect of an increase in p to facilitate the 
net-worth accumulation of the more-productive producers.
2.4 The risk-taking of the producers under the  
productivity slowdown
2.4.1 T he m otivation o f th e  analysis
In this section, we introduce idiosyncratic delay of each agent's production to 
analyze how the risk-taking behavior of the producers changes under the pro­
ductivity slowdown. The motivation of this analysis is the decline of the firms’ 
borrowing observed in Japan in the 1990’s.
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One possible reason for the decline of the borrowing is that the low rates 
of return to investment induced the firms to avoid taking risk of ex-post debt- 
overhang and refrain from borrowing. To this point, readers may argue that the 
productivity slowdown under the decreasing returns to scale in production could 
be the important factor for the decline of the firms’ credit demand, rather than 
the risk-concern of the producers. But as Hayashi and Prescott (2002) note, the 
firms kept financing their investment by the internal reserves in the 1990’s. The 
decreasing returns to scale in production do not explain why the firms spent 
their own funds on investment while cutting back their borrowing. Hence, we 
need to consider the risk associated with borrowing in this line of explanation.
Another explanation for the decline of the firms’ borrowing is that the fall of 
the collateral value of the assets reduced the borrowing limit for the firms, and 
constrained their borrowing. By using our model, we will clarify which cause is 
consistent with the productivity slowdown.
2.4.2 E xtension  o f th e m odel
The factor of production in the economy is land as before. If an agent invests 
lt units of land into production at date t , then she harvests the amount A tk  of 
goods at date t + 1  with probability /i, but the harvest may be delayed until date 
t -1-2 with probability 1 — fi. If the delay occurs, the agent needs to reinvest land 
into production. If she reinvests lt+1 of land at date t - 1-1, then she will harvest 
the amount A t+ilt+1 of goods at date t - 1-2. Note tha t the delay only postpones 
the timing of the production. Even though the agent has failed to produce the 
output, she learns from the failure and can harvest the output at the next date. 
Since the harvest occurs with probability 1 after the delay, the reinvestment 
is ex-post more efficient than the initial investment into new production under 
the same productivity level. Thus, the shock of delay is a type of the liquidity 
shocks.
We assume that the learning from the delay of production is only applied 
up to the size of the previous investment, and that the reinvestment lt+ 1 cannot 
exceed the initial investment level Zf .33 We assume that the shock of delay is
33 This assumption implies that the agents with delayed production cannot start new pro­
duction by any means. In this sense, they become infertile by the negative productivity shock.
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idiosyncratic.
If the agent does not have delayed production, then her productivity level 
changes subject to the productivity transition process (2.2). If the production is 
delayed at date t+  1 , the agent can continue the production she initiated, and 
does not receive the stochastic shock. Her productivity level grows by34
l n ( ^ +i) =  TJ -  +  ln( ^ ) -  (2 -2 1 ).1 ~ p
(2 .2 ) implies that g / ( l —p) is the long-run growth rate of the average productivity 
level in the economy. By (2.21), we assume that the productivity level of the 
agent with delayed production keeps up with the exogenous productivity growth 
in the rest of the economy. Table 2.6 summarizes the production function.
Table 2.6: Production function
date t date t - 1 -1  date t + 2
lt of land 
(At is known.)
/  (w.p. \i) A tlt of goods
\  (w.p. 1 -  fi) No goods
lt+i of land —> exp( j ^ ) A tlt+i of goods 
( < «
We assume that it is too costly to write contingent contracts, and only con­
sider the debt contracts in the credit market. The other assumptions of the 
model do not change. See appendix for the agent’s optimization problem and 
the equilibrium conditions. We can show that agents without delayed production
They can only continue the production by using their experience from the failure.
34Note that if the lenders do not invest into production at the current date, then they can 
start new production without delayed production at the next date. Thus, the assumption 
above implies that these lenders will have the productivity transitions defined by (2.2). If the 
lenders invest into their own production while lending, and have delay at the next date, then 
their productivity transitions will be subject to (2 .2 1 ).
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behave such that
{c t ,  h ,  b t+ 1)  —
( Oj +5
Oj + 5  Et 
( 0, 0,
( + ? 0 j
EtVt+ik
Vt+2
_1 +  r*+1 .
k
) if A t E CdfP/f5°°). (Constrained producers.)
j  if A t G (A tPL,A f PH). (Unconstrained producers.)
) if A t e  (A fC, A f PL). (Lender-savers.)
 QSJ
) if G (0, A t ). (Consumers.)
(2 .22)
~^SC  35 J^SPH 
t ’ tA fPH > A f PL > A ™ .35 A£PH is the lower-bound of the productivity level to
—rSC
borrow up to the limit. A^PL is the lower-bound to engage in production. A"t 
is the upper-bound to consume their net-worth. The values of ct, It, bt + 1 are
Us d* Qs^ a—1 bs
la =
_  Etvt± 1 
«  1+rt
Va d~ Qs^ a—1 ba
{ * - E t [ (1+rj ; t ; r,+1J
if A t e  (A?p h , 0 0 ), 
if A l € ( A tSPL,A f PH),
(2.23)
f>»+i =  - (1  +  r , ) ( y a +  qsls- i  -  b,)
Cs ~  Us Qs^s—i ba
i f A t e ( A t CA?PL), (2.24) 
if A t e  (0 ,A ? %  (2-25)
where
j4a_iZa_i, if the production succeeds.
Vs =
0 , if the production is delayed.
The difference of (2.22) from the previous case (2.6) is that the more-productive
producers borrow up to the limit as before, but the less-productive producers do
35As before, the levels of A f PH, A f PL and A^C depend on the current and future interest
rates and land prices. See appendix for the implicit functions to determine these levels. The
marginal agents with At =  A f PH and A f PL are indifferent between investment and lending,
—SCand those with At =  At are indifferent between lending and consumption. These marginal 
agents’ behavior can be written as
(Qi h, bt+1) — <
S P H
0 , + ,  [Et )  if At A
0 , > 0 ,
( > 0 , 0 , (—0 0 , 0 0 ) ) if At =  At .
The ranges in the brackets imply that the agent is indifferent to the corresponding variable in 
the specified range.
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not do so. This is because if they borrow much at the current date and get hit by 
the delay of production at the next date, then they will have debt-overhang and 
be forced to sell the land to repay the debts. More specifically, the flow-of-funds 
constraint and the borrowing constraint of the delayed producer at date t  +  1 
imply
2 <  Qt+ik ~  h + 1______
+  Qt+i ~  Et+iVt+2 / (1  +  r t+i)
=  (1  — 9)lt, if bt+i = EtVt+ih• (2.26)
The right-hand side of the first line is the amount of the net-worth divided by 
the minimum down-payment to buy a unit of land. The last equality is obtained 
by substituting bt + 1 =  E tvt+\k and (2 .4) . 36 (2.26) implies that lt+i <  lt , given 
6 > 0. Thus, the producers have to liquidate their land if they borrow up to the 
limit and get hit by the delay of production. This liquidation of land is costly, as 
the delayed producer would be able to harvest the production at the following 
date if they reinvested the liquidated land into delayed production. The less- 
productive1 producers do not take the risk of this debt-overhang, because they 
do not have sufficiently large return from the immediate success of the initial 
investment. Therefore, the less-productive producers refrain from borrowing up 
to the limit.
This argument immediately implies that all the producers with delayed pro­
duction borrow up to the limit, because they do not have the delay of produc­
tion again in the next date. Also, we can show tha t all the agents with delayed 
production continue to engage in production under the parameter values we con­
sider. Thus, their behavior is similar to (2.6). See appendix for the specification 
of their behavior.
2.4.3 R eason for th e  different risk-taking across th e pro­
ducers
In this subsection, we more analytically explain the reason that the less-productive 
producers find it optimal to borrow less than the limit, while the more-productive
36 As described above, the agents form rational expectation, and the values of the expected 
prices are replaced with the realized values. Then, we can obtain the last equality by substi­
tuting (2.4).
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producers borrow up to the limit. For this purpose, we compare the rates of 
return to investment and lending. Note that the agent chooses the action ac­
companied with the highest rate of return, given the predetermined net-worth.
We focus on the steady state to analytically compare the rates of return to 
investment and lending.37 For the producers without delayed production at the 
steady state, we define rj2 ,t and 773^ , respectively, as the rates of return for
borrowing up to limit, borrowing just up to the level where the agent can fully 
reinvest her land when she has the delay of production, and lending. We can 
calculate them such that
Et \^{At 4- qt+i — Vt+1) +  (1  — a0 ( 1  — Q)fi (exp ( 1^ )  A t -I- qt+2 — ^ + 2)]
V l . t  =  E tv t+ 1  ’
1+ rt
(2.27)
Et ( ^ t  +  qt+i — 1^ 7 7 ) +  (1  -  fj)p (exp ( y ^ )  A t +  qt+2 — ty+2)]
V 2 , t  =
n — TP r Vt+2 1 ’qt [ ( l +rt) ( l+ r t+i)J
(2.28)
V3 ,t =  1 +  r t . (2.29)
For each of (2.27) and (2.28), the first term of the numerator is the expected 
rate of return to investment from the immediate success. The second term is the 
one from the delay of production. This term is multiplied by (1 — 0) in (2.27), 
because the fraction 6 of land will be liquidated if production is delayed. The 
denominator is the required down-payment for unit land-investment.
Figure 2.13 draws (2.27)-(2.29) as functions of A t, given the current and 
future interest rates and land prices. First, we can show that the slope of
(2.27) is larger than (2.28), if ji > 0.5.38 This implies tha t the more-productive 
producers prefer to borrow up to the limit, and tha t only the less-productive
producers may find it optimal to borrow less than the limit.
37See appendix for the expression of the rates of return to investment and lending in the 
general dynamics, which are described as the shadow value of the net-worth. They depend 
on the expected future shadow-values of the net-worth at different dates, which we need to 
numerically calculate. However, at the steady state, the expected future shadow-values of 
the net-worth stay constant for each productivity level, so that we can normalize the rates of 
return to investment and lending by the constant value in the comparison across them, given 
the current productivity level.
38 At the steady state, the slope of (2.27) is larger than (2.28) if and only if fj, > P(9 + r)/[ 1 +  
P(9 +  r)]. As we can show /?(1  +  r) <  1 in any equilibrium, n >  0.5 is sufficient to satisfy this 
inequality for all 9 e [0,1].
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Second, the intercept of (2.28) is higher than (2.27). This is because less 
borrowing and investment raise the rate of return to investment, when the pro­
ductivity level is low and investment is inefficient. Then, we can show that (2.28) 
surpasses 1 + rt at the lower value of A t than (2.27). Denote such threshold levels 
of A t for (2.27) and (2.28) by A't and A", respectively. To analytically confirm 
A't > A ", we can obtain from (2.27)-(2.29) that
The left-hand side is the gap between the expected productivities of investment
the liquidated fraction 6 of land when the agent with A't is hit by the delay of
is consistent with the intuitive explanation for (2 .2 2 ) provided in the previous 
subsection.
utility function to the model. This is a strength of our model, as we can keep
2.4.4 D ynam ic analysis o f the producers’ risk-taking be­
havior
In this subsection, we describe the dynamic responses of the economy after the 
unexpected shocks to g and 0. We use the base-line parameter values in Table
fi = 0.9. The qualitative result of the analysis does not change by different levels
under A't and A ”. The right-hand side is the expected return to reinvesting
production .39 (2.30) implies that for borrowing up to the limit to be viable, 
the productivity level must be sufficiently high to compensate the expected loss 
from losing the profitable opportunity to reinvest into delayed production. This
Note tha t considering delay of production under credit market frictions lets 
us analyze the producers’ risk-concern without adding the producers’ concave
focusing on the producers’ profit maximization to induce their behavior.
2.1 and consider the shocks to g and 0 in Tables 2.2 and 2.4. We choose to use
of /X .40
39We can show that the right-hand side of (2.30) is positive at the steady state, if /z <  
0(1 +  rt). 0(1 +  r t ) is very close to 1 in equilibrium, under the base-line parameter values 
shown in Table 2.1.
40Given the base-line parameter values, this parameter value implies that the net-worth 
share of the unconstrained producers among all the producers is around 12% at the steady
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The responses of the economy are similar to the ones depicted in Figures 
2.5-2.10. Here, we focus on the size of the unconstrained producers, who do 
not borrow up to the limit in the economy. Figure 2.14 shows the aggregate 
borrowing-output ratio, the net-worth share of the unconstrained producers 
among all the producers, and the ratio between A ^PH and A ^PL under the 
shock to g. The figure shows that the size of the unconstrained producers in the 
economy decreases, so that the decline of the borrowing-output ratio is not due 
to the risk-averse behavior of the producers, but the reduction of the collateral 
value of land and the borrowing limit of the producers. The mechanism of this 
result is tha t the borrowing constraint propagates the negative effect of the ag­
gregate productivity slowdown on the land price. Then, the cost of investment 
decreases more than the decline of the TFP level. This increases the rate of re­
turn to investment for each producer. The higher rates of return to investment 
induce more of the producers to take the maximum leverage.
Figure 2.15 shows the similar figures to Figure 2.14 under the shock to 6. The 
figure shows that the reduction of the collateral value of land by the decline of 
6 decreases the borrowing limit of the producers and then the borrowing-output 
ratio. Also, the size of the unconstrained producers decreases. This is because 
the decline of 6 allows less liquidation of the collateral assets in case of the delay 
of production, and constrains the risk-taking of more producers. This direct 
effect increases the size of the constrained producers in the economy.
2.5 Im plication for the long stagnation in Japan 
after 1990
2.5.1 E ndogenous productivity  slowdown
Here, we discuss implication of the dynamic analysis for the long stagnation 
in Japan after 1990. Hayashi and Prescott (2002) show the importance of the 
productivity slowdown to account for the long stagnation. In our analysis of
state. To the author’s knowledge, there is no estimate for the net-worth or asset share of the 
unconstrained firms in the Japanese economy. A close estimate is Ogawa and Suzuki (2000), 
but they only reports the estimated percentage of the unconstrained firms among the listed 
Japanese firms.
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the shock to g , we show that the exogenous aggregate productivity slowdown 
is endogenously propagated by the shift of the net-worth to the low-productive 
producers.
Also in the analysis of the shock to 9, we show that the intensified legal 
restriction on liquidating collateral assets limits the leverage that the agents can 
take, and hampers the more-productive agents from accumulating land. This 
endogenously reduces the TFP level, and causes the decline of the TFP growth 
rate in transition to the new TFP trend. Hence, our model implies that the 
legal shock to the restriction on collateral liquidation such as the supreme court 
cases in 1989 and 1991 endogenously contributed to the productivity slowdown. 
This result indicates that by considering the role of the credit market in the 
economy, we need to less rely on the exogenous productivity shock to account 
for the productivity slowdown in Japan in the 1990’s.
2.5.2 R em aining low -productive ”zom bie” firms under 
th e  productiv ity  slowdown
We show that the low-productive producers start remaining in production under 
the productivity slowdown, whether the slowdown is caused by the shock to g 
or 9. This negative exit effect further propagates the decline of the TFP level 
in the productivity slowdown. This result is in line with the empirical analysis 
of ” zombie firms” , such that the low-productive firms remained in production 
being financed by the banks, and reduced the productivity level of the economy 
in the 1990’s.41 In our model, this phenomenon occurs because the productivity 
slowdown causes the falls of the land price and the interest rate, and reduces the 
cost of investment for the producers. This makes it viable for the less-productive 
agents to engage in production .42
This mechanism in our model contrasts with the analysis of Caballero, Hoshi 
and Kashyap (2004), which argue that the insolvent banks kept financing the
41Kobayashi, Saita, and Sekine (2002), Hosono and Sakuragawa (2003), Peek and Rosengren 
(2003), and Caballero, Hoshi, and Kashyap (2004).
42Barseghyan (2002) shows a similar mechanism for entry of producers by the fall of the 
manager wage. However, he does not consider any shock to the agents’ productivity levels. 
In this chapter, we show that the less-productive producers remain in production even under 
the exogenous productivity slowdown.
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insolvent unproductive firms to hide their loan losses, and letting them stay 
in production in the 1990’s. In their model, this phenomenon would raise the 
input demand and the input prices. Thus, they need to consider other shocks to 
explain the observed declines of the interest rate and the land price in the 1990’s, 
as shown in Figures 2.4 and 2.16. Our work suggests tha t the productivity shock 
and the credit market shock are among such shocks consistent with the finding 
of ’’zombie firms” remaining in production .43
2.5.3 Lack o f large fluctuation at th e onset o f the pro­
d uctiv ity  slowdown
Our analysis of the shock to g shows that under the exogenous aggregate pro­
ductivity slowdown, the downward fluctuation of the T F P level and the decline 
of the land price are large at the onset of the shock, if there is no restriction 
of liquidating collateral assets (6 = 1). This feature of the exogenous aggregate 
productivity slowdown does not match with the observation in Japan in the 
1990’s. Figure 2.1 shows that there was not much temporary decline of the TFP 
level from the new trend in the early 1990’s.
We show that considering the restriction on liquidating collateral assets mit­
igates the downward fluctuation of the TFP level, and makes the dynamics 
under the exogenous aggregate productivity slowdown closer to the observa­
tion. Also, this feature of the credit market in our model explains the large 
loan losses to the lenders after the exogenous slowdown, which is in line with 
the non-performing loans problem in the 1990’s.44 Note tha t if we consider the 
exogenous aggregate productivity slowdown in the perfectly competitive market 
model such as Hayashi and Prescott (2002), we can only explain no temporary 
downward fluctuation of the TFP level, and cannot explain the combination of 
this phenomenon with the large loan-losses associated with the decline of the 
collateral value of the assets.
43The model of Caballero, Hoshi and Kashyap implies that the increase of the input price 
deters healthy productive firms from entering the production, and further reduces the average 
productivity level in the economy. Our model does not explain this deterrence effect of ’’zombie 
firms”.
44The data issued by the Financial Service Agency shows that the ratio of the cumulative 
loan losses for the banks during 1992-1997 to the loan outstanding of the banks on March 
1992 is 9.8%.
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In the analysis of the shock to 6, we show that the intensified restriction 
of liquidating collateral assets causes the gradual level-down effect on the TFP 
trend, and the continuous stagnation of the TFP growth rate. The decline of 
the land price at the onset of the shock is also much smaller than the case of 
the exogenous aggregate productivity slowdown. This feature of the shock to 
6 is in line with the observation in the early 1990’s such tha t the productivity 
slowdown occurred without a very large fall of the land price, as shown in Figure
2.4.
The remained question is why the land price only gradually declined in the 
1990’s, while the TFP growth rate persistently stagnated. In our model, the 
exogenous aggregate productivity slowdown causes the persistent decline of the 
TFP growth rate and the large decline of the land price at the onset of the shock, 
while the intensified legal restriction on liquidating collateral assets causes the 
temporary decline of the TFP growth rate and the small decline of the land price. 
Our analysis suggests that we need to consider more aspects of the economy to 
account for this phenomenon.
2.5.4 T he cause o f the decline o f th e  firm s’ borrowing
Under both of the shocks to g and 0, the productivity slowdown is accompanied 
with the fall of the borrowing-output ratio of the firms. This matches with the 
observation in Japan, as shown in Figure 2.17. In the discussion by academics 
and professionals to explain this observation, there have appeared two possible 
mechanisms. One is that the firms did not take risk due to low rates of return to 
their investment, and reduced their borrowing. The other is that the borrowing 
of the firms was constrained by the fall of the collateral value of land. Our model 
implies that the size of the unconstrained borrower-producers in the economy 
decreases under the productivity slowdown, as shown in Figures 2.14 and 2.15, 
so that the cause of the stagnant firms’ borrowing in Japan was due to the fall 
of the collateral value of land, rather than the risk-averse behavior of the firms.
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2.5.5 T he exit o f th e  m ore-productive firm s despite the  
stay o f th e  less-productive
The model extended in Section 2.4 has implication to the observation that the 
more-productive firms exited from production, while the less-productive stayed 
in the 1990’s. Nishimura, Kiyota and Nakajima (2003) and Fukao and Kwon 
(2004) observe this phenomenon in the Japanese firm data in the 1990’s. As 
shown by (2 .2 2 ), the more-productive producers take more leverage than the 
less-productive producers. This is because the less-productive producers are 
afraid of having the debt-overhang in the delay of production. This makes the 
more-productive producers more fragile to the unexpected decline of the land 
price. More specifically, the conditions for the producers to avoid liquidating 
land to repay their debts are45 
EtVt+i
^ > E t_ 
1 + rt
1 +  r t
r vt+i
> E t- \v t — A t~i for the constrained producers. (2.31)
— A t -1  for the unconstrained producers. (2.32)
1 +  rt
(2.4) implies that E t- iv t > E t-i[vt+i / ( l  +  r t)], and tha t the lowest level of 
Etv t+ 1 to satisfy the condition is higher for the constrained producers than the 
unconstrained around the threshold productivity level to take the maximum 
leverage Af.f/ * . 46 This is because their productivity levels are close, but the 
amounts of borrowing are different.
2.5.6 T he effect o f the increased p rod uctiv ity  gap across 
th e  firms
Fukao and Kwon (2004) estimate the productivity transition process (2.2) for 
the Japanese manufacturing firms over the 1990’s. They find increases of p and 
the productivity gap across the firms. The latter empirical finding matches with 
the discussion in the media such that the firms were polarized between ’’winner
firms” and ’’loser firms” in the 1990’s. Our analysis on an increase of p clarifies
45From the flow-of-funds constraint, the net-worth per unit of land for the producers without 
delayed production is A t-i 4- qt — bt. To avoid liquidating land, this has to be greater than 
the minimum down-payment required to buy a unit of land qt — E t V t + i / ( l  +  r t ) .
46 Here, we distinguish the productivity level of the producers by At~i, rather than At . This 
is because in the empirical analysis, the firms are classified by their productivity level for the 
current production, rather than the expected productivity level for the next production.
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the general equilibrium effect of this structural change in the firm dynamics. We 
show that it has a positive effect on the TFP level, but that this effect becomes 
smaller as 6 is lower. Hence, the legal restriction on liquidating collateral assets 
prevented the positive effect of the observed increase in p from mitigating the 
long stagnation in Japan.
2.6 Conclusion
This chapter has analyzed the effect of legal restriction on liquidating collateral 
assets on the TFP level of the economy by constructing a heterogeneous agents 
model with credit market frictions. Using this model, we have analyzed the 
dynamic responses of the economy to structural changes, and discussed the 
implication of the model for the long stagnation in Japan after 1990.
We have first considered an exogenous aggregate productivity slowdown. We 
find that the legal restriction on liquidating collateral assets mitigates the down­
ward fluctuation of the TFP level of the economy after the shock, while raising 
the loan-loss rate to the lenders. Second, we have investigated the effect of the 
intensified legal restriction on liquidating collateral assets, and show that such 
a legal shock endogenously reduces the TFP growth rate, and also causes loan 
losses to the lenders by unexpectedly reducing the land price. Third, we have 
found that an increase of persistence of the agent’s productivity level raises the 
TFP level of the economy, but that the legal restriction on liquidating collateral 
assets reduces this positive effect. In relation to the long stagnation in Japan, 
our model implies that the legal restriction mitigated the downward fluctuation 
of the TFP level at the onset of the productivity slowdown, but endogenously 
deepened the productivity slowdown over time.
In the analysis, we have found that the low-productive producers remain in 
production under the productivity slowdown. This is because the land price 
is lowered during the slowdown, which in turn reduces the cost of investment. 
The low cost of investment makes it viable for the low-productive producers 
to engage in production. Also, our model implies tha t the more-productive 
producers take the maximum leverage by borrowing up to the limit, while the 
less-productive producers do not do so, fearing the debt-overhang in case that
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they are hit by delay of production. Hence, the more-productive producers are 
more fragile to the unexpected fall of the land price than the less-productive, if 
their productivity levels and income from production are close. These features 
match with the observed firm dynamics in the long stagnation in Japan.
A remarkable point of our result is that we have shown tha t the credit market 
shock can endogenously cause the productivity slowdown, so tha t we need to less 
rely on the exogenous productivity slowdown to account for the long stagnation 
in Japan after 1990. Although Hayashi and Prescott (2002) plays down the role 
of the credit market in the long stagnation in Japan after 1990, our result implies 
that the credit market shock is important to understand the mechanism of the 
long stagnation, as it is one of the distinct features of the Japanese economy 
in the 1990’s. Related to this point, Hayashi and Prescott (2002) highlight 
the increase of the aggregate capital-output ratio observed in the 1990’s as an 
evidence of the importance of the productivity shock in the long stagnation, 
and the stable aggregate investment-output ratio as an evidence for irrelevance 
of the credit market shock. However, the next chapter shows tha t a credit market 
shock can increase the aggregate capital-output and investment-output ratios in 
a model of credit market frictions with sunk cost of investment, so that their 
evidence does not necessarily indicate irrelevance of the credit market shock.
In our model, the exogenous aggregate productivity slowdown causes the 
persistent decline of the TFP growth rate and the large decline of the land price 
at the onset of the shock, while the intensified legal restriction on liquidating 
collateral assets causes the temporary decline of the TFP growth rate and the 
small decline of the land price. Even though the latter result matches with the 
small decline of the land price under the decline of the TFP growth rate in the 
early 1990’s, either type of the shocks does not account for the lasting gradual 
decline of the land price under the persistent stagnation of the TFP growth 
rate over the 1990’s and even after that. Our analysis suggests that we need 
to consider more aspects of the economy to account for this combination of the 
observations in Japan after 1990. This is left for the future research.
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Appendix
2.A .I. Mortgage laws in Japan
In this part, we describe restriction on liquidating collateral assets under the mortgage 
laws in Japan, and the supreme court cases in 1989 and 1991 which intensified the 
restriction. The restriction was taken as an impediment against swift liquidation of 
collateral assets by the lenders during the 1990’s, which led to the revision of the 
mortgage laws in 2003. Our description in this section refers to the report issued by 
the Ministry of Justice in 2002; ”A supplementary note for the interim proposal for 
the Law to Revise a Part of the Civil Laws for a Reform of the Mortgage and Civil 
Execution System.” We also refer to Yamazaki, Seshimo, Ohta and Sugihara (2005) 
for the supreme court cases in 1989 and 1991.
First, we describe the mortgage laws. We use one paragraph for each restriction 
on liquidating collateral asset.
(Protection of short-term lease contracts.) Execution of the mortgage by the 
lenders rescinds the lease contract of the mortgaged land property and the building on 
it, if the mortgage agreement precedes the lease contract. But the Civil Law protected 
the preceded lease contract, if its duration was within a certain length (5 years for the 
land lease, and 3 years for the building lease,) unless the lenders suffered loss from the 
protection. Even though existence of the lease contract reduced the collateral values 
of the land properties and the buildings, the court did not necessarily recognize them 
as the loss to the lenders. The borrowers abused this article of the law to lower the 
collateral values of the properties and the buildings, and demanded compensations 
from the lenders to cancel the lease contracts in some cases. By the revision of the 
laws in 2003, the maximum length of the lease contracts for the protection is now 6 
months, unless the lenders have agreed a longer lease contracts beforehand.
(Protection of buildings on mortgaged land properties.) When a lender foreclosed 
on the land property, she could auction the building on it as well, if the mortgage 
agreement preceded the construction of the building. But the lender could only auction 
the land property, if the owner of the building was a third party who had constructed it 
even after the mortgage agreement. Even though the buyer of the foreclosed property 
could obtain a court order to destroy the third party’s building, it was costly to go 
through the necessary procedure. Thus, this protection could lower the collateral 
values of the land properties. By the revision of the laws in 2003, this protection of
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the third party’s building was abolished.
(Civil Execution Law.) The court order to remove the occupant from the fore­
closed property had to correctly identify the occupant. This requirement let malicious 
borrowers to deter foreclosures of the land properties by keeping changing the occu­
pants to dodge the court. By the revision of the laws in 2003, this requirement was 
relaxed.
(Foreclosure auction system.) The lender has to use the public auction managed 
by the court to foreclose on the mortgaged land property. The court sets the minimum 
price for the bids at every auction. Idee and Taguchi (2002) examine the foreclosure 
auction data from the court district of the second largest city, Osaka, for 1997-2000, 
and observe that improvement of the auction procedure in 1998, including a relaxation 
of the minimum price rule, had a positive effect on the success rate of foreclosures.
(Compulsory foreclosure.) If the borrower sold or lease the mortgaged land prop­
erty to a third party, then the third party could offer to cancel the mortgage by paying 
the lender a certain value of money. To counter the offer, the lender had to foreclose 
on the land property through the public auction. If they could not sell it for more 
than 110% of the offered value, then she had to buy the land property by herself for 
110% of the offered value. Since the execution of the mortgage would rescind the sales 
contract of the mortgaged land property to the third party, the payment from the 
lender would be made to the borrower, and offset by the lender’s secured claim. By 
the revision of the laws in 2003, the lender does not have to buy the property even if 
the foreclosure fails. It was costly for the lender to go through the procedure to use 
the public auctions without choosing the favorable timing of foreclosure. The lender 
had to accept too low offer from the third party to cancel the mortgage in some cases. 
By the revision of the laws in 2003, the lender is now given more time to foreclose on 
the mortgaged property after the third party’s offer to cancel the mortgage.
(Administration of the mortgaged property.) The lenders were not entitled to ad­
minister the properties before execution of the mortgage, and could only seize the pay­
ments from the tenants to the borrower, if the borrower defaulted. But the payments 
included the administration fees of the property, so that the seizure could hamper the 
administration of the property and lower its value, if there were multiple lenders. By 
the revision of the laws in 2003, it is now possible for the lenders to request the court 
to appoint an administrator to the mortgaged property, if the borrower defaults.
Second, we describe the two supreme-court cases in 1989 and 1991. The case 
in 1989 was about the protection of short-term lease contracts described above. To
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prevent this protection from being abused, the lender could make a lease contract of 
the property with the borrower by her own. But the supreme court judged that such 
a lease contract by the lender is not accompanied with actual use of the property, and
abused short-term lease contract. The supreme-court case in 1991 was about whether 
the lender could move out the occupant from the mortgaged property after rescinding 
an abused short-term lease contract. The court judged that the mortgage right did 
not include the right to do so. This judicial precedent had been effective until the 
supreme court allowed the lender to move out the occupant in another case in 1999.
2 .A .2 Solving th e  agen t’s optim ization  problem
Here, we describe the agent’s optimization problem in the model extended in Section
2.4. This model nests the basic model described in Section 2.2 by setting f i =  1. The 
recursive form of the agent’s optimization problem is
invalid. This judicial precedents implies that, for abuse of short-term lease contracts, 
the lender can rescind them by the Civil laws only after the borrower has made an
V t { y t  +  q t h - i  ~  bt, A t , y t )
max c t +  / 3 E t Vt + i { y t + i  +  q t + i k  ~  k + i ,  A t + i ,  y t + i) (2.33)
A t - i U - i ,  if the production succeeds.t - l H - 1>
Vt =  <
0, if the production is delayed.
c t , k  > 0
h  < k - i  if the production is delayed.
where
Zt exp { g t / [ ]
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We normalize the problem to make it stationary. y s is the amount of the output at 
date s .  The first constraint is the flow-of-funds constraint. The second constraint is 
the borrowing constraint. The third constraint is the production function. The forth 
constraint is the non-negativity constraint for consumption and the land-investment. 
The last constraint is the maximum reinvestment into delayed production. The ex­
pectation is taken for the success and delay of the harvest of production, the values 
of q s , r s and v s , and the productivity levels in the future, given the productivity level 
for the current investment A t  and whether the harvest is delayed or not at the current 
date.
For the state variables of the problem, y t  turns out independently of the net-worth 
in the argument of the value function Vt .  This is because the success and delay of 
production change the success probability of the next production. The functional form 
of Vt  changes over time, according to the series of the future interest rates and land 
prices.
We start from solving the agent’s optimization problem at the steady state, where 
q t and r t are constant. Vt  takes an identical functional form over time. We recursively 
apply the Lagrange method and the envelope theorem to calculate the optimum con­
ditions. In so doing, note that the function E t V t  is not differentiable at It =  0, because 
the agent with It =  0  will receive the productivity transition shock c t + 1 in (2.2) for 
sure at the next date, but the agent with It >  0 has the probability of the delay of 
production, and will not receive the productivity transition shock in such a case. We 
split the choice set of the agent into the two sub-domains between It  > 0  with having 
the probability of the delay, and It =  0  without having the probability of the delay. 
The function E t V  is differentiable in each sub-domain. We solve the agent’s optimum 
behavior for each sub-domain, and then identify the agent’s optimum behavior for 
the whole choice set by the one giving the higher payoff between the two. We can 
show that the action under It =  0 with having the probability of the delay is always 
dominated the one under It =  0  without having the probability of the delay, so that 
adding l t  =  0 with having the probability of the delay into the choice set of the agent 
does not change the optimum behavior of the agent, but only makes each of the two 
sub-domains closed.
After obtaining the optimum conditions at the steady state, we consider the dy­
namics converging to the steady state. By recursively applying the Lagrange method 
and the envelope theorem, we obtain the shadow values of the net-worth for the agents
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w ithout delayed production such that
+ qt+i ~E t
Af;t(at) =  —
+
A. _fit 1+rt
{1 -  fi)(l -  d)P2 (at + qt + 2 ~ t)t+2) Af+2(dt+2)]
* _  E t v t f i 
«  1 + r t
(2.34)
Qt ~  E t yt+2 1( l + r t ) ( l + r t + i )  J
Et 
+ —
(1 -  aO/32 (At +  qt+2 -  Vt+2 ) Af+2(At+2)]
Qt — E t y t+ 2 ( l + r t ) ( l + r t + i )
(2.35)
Af,t(&t) =  3(1 +  f t)£ ([A?+1(dm )] (2.36)
A?,t(a,) =  1 (2.37)
*?(“ <) =  max {A ft(d(), A |,(d t), A ft(a (), Af((dt)} (2.38)
d( =  ln(A(). A?( for j  =  1,2, 3,4 is the Lagrange multipliers for the flow-of-funds
constraint of the agent without delayed production. The subscripts 1, 2, 3 and 4,
respectively, correspond to the cases under investing and borrowing up to the limit,
investing and borrowing less than the limit, lending and consuming. Af(d*) is the 
value of the Lagrange multiplier when the agent takes the optimal behavior, given the 
productivity level.
We can obtain A f PH, A f P L  and A ^ C  by
A?lt(*?™ ) =  X s2t t ( a f P H ) (2.39)
Aflt(AfPL) =  Afi4(&fPL) (2.40)
4 M St C ) =  (2.41)
where
&fPH =  ln (4?‘P H ) -  g(t +  1)/(1 -  p) (2.42)
& f P L  =  ln (4 fPZ') -  g(t +  1)/(1 -  p) (2.43)
d f c  =  ln (3 fC) - S(t +  l ) / ( l - p )  (2.44)
We can numerically show that A ^ P H  > A f P L  >  A ^ C  in the dynamics under the 
parameter values we consider. Thus, we can obtain (2.22).
To obtain the Lagrange multiplier for the agent with delayed production, we only 
need to insert fi  =  1 into (2.34) for the borrower-producers. For the lenders and the
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consumers, the values of the Lagrange multiplier are the same as (2.36) and (2.37). 
Denote the values of the Lagrange multiplier corresponding to (2.34), (2.36) and (2.37) 
by Af^, X%t and A^t, respectively. We define a ^ P H  and a ^ c  as
=  max{X $ t { a f PH), A & (df ™ )}  (2.45)
m ax{A ^ (dfc ), A^f ( d f c )} =  X%t ( a ? c ) (2.46)
We can show that a f P H  >  o t f c . If X f  t(at)) <  max{Af ^ (d*)), Afjt(dt))} for all df, 
then a ® P H  — ot®c . Thus, we obtain the optimum behavior for the agents with delayed 
production as
I ( 0 , +, Etvt+1lt ) if <5*6(6?™  0 0 ).
( 0, 0, -  ) i f 6 ( e ( 6 ? c ,a ? ™ ) . (2.47)
( +> 0 ) if a t e  (—o o ,d fc ).
The marginal agents with d* =  a j ? P H  are indifferent between investment and lending, 
and those with d* =  a ® c  are indifferent between lending and consumption. (2.47) 
only shows the signs of some variables. The values of these variables take similar forms 
as the first equation in (2.7), (2.8) and (2.9).
2 .A .3 T he equilibrium  conditions
The delayed producers should have invested into production at the previous date, and 
must have the productivity level equal to or more than exp ( ) A i - i ' . To simplify 
the notation, we denote the lowest productivity level of the delayed producers who 
continue their production by a f p  such that
d f p =  max { a ? I >1L , a ? P H )  (2.48)
From the previous section in the appendix, we obtain the land market clearing 
condition as
roo roo
/  L f ( a t ) d & t +  L ?  ( &t ) d a t =  1 (2.49)
Ja.fPL
L Jt ( a t ) is the land-investment distribution function at date t, for j  =  S, D. The 
superscripts S  and D , respectively, imply the distribution for the agents without and 
with delayed production.
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The credit market clearing condition is
.A .S P L  „ A ,D Pr §?(&t)d&t + r n Lf(&t)d&t
Jafc Ja?c l +  n  J&SPH
r  Lf(&t)d&t 
J&fr-
+  E t  '
.A .S P H
' S / *
(1 +  r*)(l +  f t + i ) m
+  y ~ -  f ° °  L ? ( a t ) d & t (2.50)
! +  rt J a P p
S 3 (a*) is the normalized lending distribution function at date t , for j  =  S , D .  The 
superscript S  is for the agents without delayed production, and D  for those with 
delayed production. The left-hand side of the equation is the aggregate lending, and 
the right-hand side is the aggregate borrowing. The first term in the right-hand side 
is the borrowing of the constrained borrower-producers without delayed production. 
The second term is the borrowing of the unconstrained borrower-producers without 
delayed production. The third term is the borrowing of the borrower-producers with 
delayed production, who borrow up to the limit.47
To specify the aggregate land demand and the aggregate lending, we need to obtain 
the land-investment and the lending distribution functions L Jt ( a t )  and S 3t ( a t )  for j  =  
S , D .  To do so, we first aggregate the flow-of-funds constraint of the optimization 
problem (2.33) to obtain the aggregate net-worth. For the agents without delayed 
production represented by the superscript 5,
roo
W ts ( a t ) =  /  (exp(df_ i ) +  ?t -  E t - i v t ) i i L f _ 1 ( a t - i ) f ( a t \ a t - i ) d a t -- l
J&fffS P H
z , SPH
Vt+1
1 + f t
rat-1
+ /  ( exp(<Vi) +  qt -  E t - 1
Ja?pt  V
r st-i
+ / (1 + rt-i)St-i(at-i)f(at\at-i)d&t-i
roo
+ /  (exp (at- i)  + qt-Et-iVt)L?_i(&t-i)f(6tt\6tt-i)d6it-i
+ / (l + h -i)S tL i(& t-i)f(a t \&t-i)dat-i (2.51)
[at + l f P<xt - i
where
=  7 ^ e x p  { ------------2,P -------------J (2-52)
W f ( a t )  is the normalized aggregate net-worth distribution function for the agents 
who do not have delayed production and have the normalized productivity level a t  at
47If a ^ c  <  a f - i '  and a ^ p  = , then there is no delayed producer who terminates her
production or lends her net-worth. is zero for all a t in such a case.
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date t .  If we add g t / (  1 — p ), and then take the exponential, then we can obtain the 
level of the aggregate net-worth distribution. f ( a t \ a t - i )  is the conditional probability 
to have a t  given a t - 1> which is defined by the productivity transition (2.2).
For the agents with delayed production represented by the superscript D ,48
(qt -  Et- iv t){l -  fj^L f^& t-1), for at- i  £ [dfj^oo).
 ^(qt -  Et- 1 Th^]) (1 -  i), for a t- i  £ [af!?, af-i*)-
(2.53)
W f * ( a t )  is the normalized aggregate net-worth distribution function for the agents 
with delayed production. From the aggregate net-worth, we can obtain the land-
investment and the
L f ( & t  
' Lst (&t
sn& t
L ? { & t
St(& t
ending distribution functions as 
W ts (& t)
qt  -  E t v t+ i / ( l r t ) 
Wts (at)
Qt — E t
=
yt+ 2
W tD ( a t )
q t -  E t v t + i / ( l  +  f t ) 
=  W tD ( a t )
for a t £  [ a f P H , oo) 
for a t £  [ a f P L , a ? P H )
for or £  [(a f c , a f P L ) 
for a t £  oo)
for a t £  [d fc , d ? p )
(2.54)
(2.55)
(2.56)
(2.57)
(2.58)
Given the parameters of the model (/5, p, g ,  p, cr, 9 ), and the initial values and 
functions of d^p p , otLPL, a p p , a E - i V o ,  E - \ [ v \ / ( l  +  ro)], V _ x ( a - 1) and (1 +  
r _ i ) 5 i1(d_i) for j  =  5, D ,  we define equilibrium as
•  {cs, l s , ^s+i}^o solve the optimization problem (2.33), given the current and 
future prices {&,,rs ,'5s}^ =oi Consequently, { a f P H , d f PL, d f p , d?'7} ^  3X6 
derived for j  =  S , D \
• { L Ja ( a s ) ,  Ss(da)}“ 0 are recursively determined by (2.51)-(2.58), given {<?s, rs,
E s v s + 1 , E s [vs + 2 / ( l  +  f 3+1)\, d fp p , d fPL, d f p , d iC}£L0 for j  =  S , D , and the
initial values and functions;
•  {<Zsj 8X6 determined in order to satisfy the market clearing conditions 
(2.49) and (2.50), and the definition of v s in (2.4);
•  the agents form rational expectation about the future prices {gs, rs , 
every date t \
48In (2.53), we assume the marginal producers with &t-i =  af- i '  and a f - i 1 > respectively, 
borrow E t- i v t l t- i  and Et- i[vt+ i / ( l  -I- f t)]h-1- This is valid, as these amounts of borrowings 
are weakly optimal, and their size in the economy is zero.
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•  there is no bubble in the land price, so that at every date t .
The goods market clears in equilibrium by Walras’ Law.
2 .A .4 C alculating th e  equilibrium  dynam ics.
We describe the calculation method for the transitory dynamics between the steady 
states. To simplify the notation, we denote q t  — v t + i / ( l  +  f t )  by ut -  We conduct the 
following iteration:
1. Calculate the steady states under the parameter values before and after the 
shock. The steady state before the shock provides the initial condition of the 
economy. Use the new steady-state values for {£s}s=*+i and { a f p p , d fPL, d fc , 
®% P Y s= t - 1  each date  ^b1 the next step.
2. From date 0 onward, we calculate u t , f t  and W ^ ( a t )  for j  =  S , D  by the 
market clearing conditions and the integral equation for the net-worth distri­
bution (2.11)-(2.58) until they converge to the new steady-state levels, given 
<70) {v s Y s tY t+ i  and { & a P H i & s P L i ^ ? P } a = t - i  obtained in the step 3, and
W/_1(o:t_i) for j  =  S , D  and f t - i  at each date t .  i) for j  =  S , D  and
f t - 1  are updated forward.
3. From the date of convergence toward date 0, we calculate u t ,  f t ,  & f PH> & t P L i 
a f c , and a f p  by all the equilibrium conditions, given W/_1(o!t_i) for j  =  S , D  
and f t - 1  obtained in the step 2, , & t - i i  & t~:I an  ^ obtained in the
previous step 3, and {u5, Af (ds) } ^ +1 at each date t .  {us , Af (da) } ^ +1 are 
updated backward, and qo is also calculated.
4. Check the convergence of the series of {us, at the steps 2 and 3 with the 
series at the step 3 in the previous iteration by supnorm. All the series converge 
to the new steady state by date 200 in the cases we consider. The convergence 
criterion is le  — 5 for the ratios between the two series. If they do not converge, 
return to the step 2.
In the step 3, we need to solve the integral equations for Af (Af) and W f ( a t ) .  To 
approximate the values of the integrals, we apply the Legendre nodes and weights for 
the domains (—oo,& f C ),  [df^, & t P L )> [ & t P L i ®-tP H )i [ & t P H  •> °°) and [ ^ F P 0^0) a  ^each 
date t  by replacing ±oo with a high and a low values, as in the steady-state calculation.
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In the cases we consider, the delayed producers always continue their production, so 
that we do not need to consider the domains ( —00, a f 0 ) and [ a f > c , a f p ).
By (2.34)-(2.38), we can show that the value of Af (a*) only depends on {u3, 
and {ua, As vt is determined by {ut, r3}%t, (a f PH, a f PL, d fc , d f p )
can be uniquely specified by the series of {Ks,r s}“ t. Hence, we only need to check 
the convergence of {ua,rs}£ l0 in the step 4.
The intuition of this iteration process is that we obtain the equilibrium series 
backward from the new steady state in the step 3, because the agent’s behavior and 
the land price are forward-looking. However, the net-worth distribution is history- 
dependent, so we update the time-path of the net-worth distribution from the old 
steady state to the new steady state in the step 2 in each iteration.
2 .A .5 E stim atin g  th e  T F P  grow th rate by th e  Solow  residual.
We approximate the aggregate production function of the Japanese economy by the 
Cobb-Douglas function. The capital share is 0.361, taken from Hayashi and Prescott. 
The output is GDP. The capital stock is the sum of the inventory, the net fixed assets, 
and the intangible non-financial assets, net of the amounts held by the government. 
The National Accounts provide the nominal value of the capital stock evaluated at 
the replacement cost. The labor force is the number of the employed workers times 
the average hours worked. The output and the capital stock axe deflated by the GDP 
deflator. Hayashi and Prescott (2002) calculate the real value of the capital stock in 
the same way. We take the output, the capital stock and the number of the employed 
workers from the 1968 SNA for 1970-1998 and from the 1993 SNA for 1990-2002. The 
1993 SNA is only available for this period. We take the average hours worked from 
’’Maitsuki Kinro Tokei Chosa,” an establishment survey conducted by the Ministry of 
Welfare and Labor.
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Figure 2.1: The TFP level in Japan (1990=1.)
68SNA 9 3 S N A  1975-1990 TFP trend
0.9
0.8
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Source: National Accounts.
Note: We calculate the TFP growth rates by the Solow residual. ’’63SNA” is calculated by the 
data of the 1963 Standard of the National Account. This data is only available for 1970-1998. 
’’93SNA” corresponds to the 1993 standard. This data is only available for 1990-2002. ”1975- 
1990 TFP trend” grows at the constant rate 1.98%. 1.98% is the average TFP growth rate 
for 1975-1990 calculated by the 1963 SNA. See appendix for more detail of the calculation.
Figure 2.2: The TFP growth rate in Japan
68SNA ^>-93SNA
Source: National Accounts.
Note: We calculate the TFP growth rates by the Solow residual. See the note of Figure 2.1.
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Figure 2.3: Flow of the loan write-offs accounted by the Japanese banks
Loan write-offs
-  ♦ -  Loan write-offs (without the amounts sold to CCPC)
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Source: Financial Service Agency.
Note: The figure is normalized by the aggregate bank lending each year. ’’The loan write-offs 
without the amounts sold to CCPC” excludes the amounts of the write-offs by loan sales to 
Cooperative Credit Purchasing Co., Ltd (CCPC). This is because CCPC was set up by the 
banks only to intermediate liquidation of collateral assets. Liquidation was not swift. As 
of March 1998, CCPC had only collected 24% of the purchased values of the mortgages by 
then. Thus, a large part of the accounted loan write-offs by the loan sales to CCPC was not 
liquidated in fact.
Figure 2.4: The real land price index in Japan (1985=1.)
1.4
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O  T-
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Source: Japan Real Estate Institute, and National Accounts.
Note: The real land price is the Nationwide City Land Price Index divided by the GDP 
deflator.
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Figure 2.5: TFP, the land price and the real interest rate after the shock to g
TFP dTFP /TFP
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Note: The unit of the horizontal axis is year, g permanently declines from 0.0073 to 0.0058 
at date 0. The initial state of the dynamics is the old steady state under g =  0.0073.
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Figure 2.6: The entry and exit threshold for the productivity level after the
shock to g
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Note: The unit of the horizontal axis is year, g permanently declines from 0.0073 to 0.0058 
at date 0. The initial state of the dynamics is the old steady state under g =  0.0073. is Q
the threshold of the productivity level to engage in production. At is the threshold of the 
productivity level to consume all the net-worth.
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Figure 2.7: The net-worth distribution at date 0 after the shock to g
Shock to g: 0=1 Shock to g: 0=0.5
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10
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A -l
 Without the shock
 After the shock
Note: g permanently declines from 0.0073 to 0.0058 at date 0. The initial state of the dynamics 
is the old steady state under g =  0.0073. The figure shows the net-worth distributions of the 
agents at date 0 over the productivity levels A_i before the productivity transitions. There 
are three vertical dotted lines in each graph. For the agents without delayed production, the 
left vertical line is the border between the consumers and the lenders. The right line is the one 
between the lenders and the borrowers. The figure includes the net-worth of all the borrower- 
producers with and without delayed production. The distribution named as ’’Without the 
shock” is the distribution without the shock to g , and the one named as ’’After the shock” is 
the actual distribution after the shock.
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Figure 2.8: TFP, the land price and the real interest rate after the shock to 6
TFPt dTFPt/TFPt
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Note: The unit of the horizontal axis is year. 6 permanently declines from 0.1 to 0.031 at date 
0. The initial state of the dynamics is the old steady state under 6 =  0.1.
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Figure 2.9: The entry and exit threshold for the productivity level after the
shock to 9
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Note: The unit of the horizontal axis is year. 9 permanently declines from 0.1 to 0.031 at date 
0. The initial state of the dynamics is the old steady state under 6 =  0.1. A f  is the threshold 
of the productivity level to engage in production. At is the threshold of the productivity level 
to consume all the net-worth.
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Figure 2.10: The net-worth distribution at date 0 after the shock to 9
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Note: 6 permanently declines from 0.1 to 0.031 at date 0. The initial state of the dynamics is 
the old steady state under 6 = 0.1. The figure shows the net-worth distributions of the agents 
at date 0 over the productivity levels A -1  before the productivity transitions. There are three 
vertical dotted lines in each graph. For the agents without delayed production, the left vertical 
line is the border between the consumers and the lenders. The right line is the one between 
the lenders and the borrowers. The figure includes the net-worth of all the borrower-producers 
with and without delayed production. The distribution named as ’’Without the shock” is the 
distribution without the shock to 0, and the one named as ’’After the shock” is the actual 
distribution after the shock.
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Figure 2.11: TFP, the land price and the real interest rate after the shock to p 
under g = 0
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Note: The unit of the horizontal axis is year, g =  0. p permanently increases from 0.614 to 
0.765 at date 0. The initial state of the dynamics is the old steady state under p = 0.614.
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Figure 2.12: The entry and exit threshold for the productivity level after the
shock to p under g =  0
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Note: The unit of the horizontal axis is year, g = 0. p permanently increases from 0.614 to 
0.765 at date 0. The initial state of the dynamics is the old steady state under p = 0.614. A f  
is the threshold of the productivity level to engage in production. At is the threshold of the 
productivity level to consume all the net-worth.
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Figure 2.13: The rate of return to unit net-worth invested or lent under the 
possible delay of production
27)
t
Note: The curves denoted as (2.27) and (2.28), respectively, are the rates of return to unit 
net-worth for borrowing up to the limit and less than the limit under each productivity level 
At at the steady state. They correspond to the equations (2.27) and (2.28) such that
Et [/*(At + Qt+i ~ v*+i) + (1 — /i)(l — 0)0 (exp ( r ^ )  At + qt+2 — ^t+2 j^ j
(2.27) Etvt+i
q t ~  T h T
Et, \ u ( A t  -\- a*4-i — , 7*7 -  ^ +  (1 — u
(2.28) =
t [(* 1[ t + qt+ i+ ++l) ■ - v ) P \ (exp (: * ) 1 At +  qt + 2 -  vt+2^|
q t - E t \ Vt+2 ][(l+i"t)(l+re+i)
In drawing the curves, we take the current and future interest rates and land prices as given. 
The dotted horizontal line is the rate of return to unit net-worth for lending.
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Figure 2.14: The borrowing-output ratio, the net-worth share of the uncon­
strained producers and A t PH/ A ^ PL after the shock to g
Borrowing-output ratio Net-worth share of UCP
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Note: The unit of the horizontal axis is year, g permanently declines from 0.0073 to 0.0058 
at date 0. The initial state of the dynamics is the old steady state under g =  0.0073. ’’The 
net-worth share of UCP” is the net-worth share of the unconstrained producers among all the 
producers.
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Figure 2.15: The borrowing-output ratio, the net-worth share of the uncon­
strained producers and A f PH/ A ^ PL after the shock to 6
Borrowing-output ratio Net-worth share of UCP
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Note: The unit of the horizontal axis is year. 6 permanently declines from 0.1 to 0.031 at date 
0. The initial state of the dynamics is the old steady state under 6 =  0.1. ’’The net-worth 
share of UCP” is the net-worth share of the unconstrained producers among all the producers.
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Figure 2.16: The real interest rate in Japan (%)
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Source: Bank of Japan.
Notes: The figure shows the ex-post annual real interest rates. The real interest rates are 
calculated by the long-term nominal interest rates minus the realized inflation rates. The 
inflation rates are calculated by GDP deflators.
Figure 2.17: The borrowing-output ratio in Japan
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Source: National Accounts and Flow of Funds Statistics.
Notes: ’’Loans to firms”, ’’Bonds of firms” and ’’Shares of firms” are taken from the aggregate 
liabilities of the private firms in Flow of Funds Statistics. Shares include private shares. The 
output is GDP.
Chapter 3 
Sunk Cost of Investm ent and 
Credit Crunch
Abstract
This chapter investigates the effect of a credit crunch on macroeconomic indi­
cators in a model of credit market frictions. We show that a persistent credit 
crunch increases the capital- and the investment-output ratios in the economy, 
if there exists a sufficiently large sunk cost of investment. In the dynamic anal­
ysis of a temporary credit crunch, we show that the credit crunch reduces bor­
rowing of the producers and their debt-repayments ex-post, and subsequently 
increases their net-worth. This makes the capital- and the investment-output 
ratios overshoot the steady state level in the recovery from the shock. We discuss 
implication of the model to the long stagnation in Japan after 1990.
3.1 Introduction
One of the features of the long stagnation in Japan after 1990 was the non­
performing loans problem in the banking sector. Several researchers discuss 
whether there is a link between this problem and the stagnation of the investment 
growth in Japan in the 1990’s. Estimating the investment function, Motonishi 
and Yoshikawa (1999) find that the decline of demand for the capital stock 
mostly explained the investment of the firms in the industry-level data, while 
Nagahata and Sekine (2005) and Ogawa (2003) find tha t the firms’ investment
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was affected by the supply conditions of the bank loans, such as the bank capital, 
in the firm-level data.
Hayashi and Prescott (2002) join this discussion from a different perspective 
by using a general equilibrium analysis. Using the standard exogenous growth 
model, they show that a productivity slowdown well explains the observed de­
cline of the detrended value-added, increase of the capital-output ratio (Figure 
3.1), and decrease of the after-tax return on capital in Japan after 1990. The 
credit crunch does not play any role in their model. The reason for them to 
use the model with the complete credit market is tha t the investment-output 
ratio did not decline in the 1990’s despite the fall of the bank loans to the firms 
(Figure 3.2). They argue that this observation indicates that there was no credit 
crunch constraining the firms’ investment.
In this chapter, we investigate how a credit crunch would affect the capital- 
and the investment-output ratios in a model of credit market frictions. We find 
three effects of a credit crunch. The first effect is to hamper the investment into 
the capital stock. This effect makes the capital stock more scarce in production 
relative to the fixed-supplied factor of production, such as land and labor, and 
works toward increasing the marginal productivity of capital and reducing the 
capital-output ratio.
The second effect of a credit crunch is obtained from the insight of Kiyotaki 
and Moore (1997) such that the credit market facilitates the resource reallocation 
from the less-productive producers to the more-productive through borrowing. 
As a corollary, a trouble in the financial intermediation hampers the resource 
allocation to the more-productive producers, and reduces the average productiv­
ity level in the economy. This works toward reducing the marginal productivity 
of capital and increasing the capital-output ratio in the economy. As this second 
effect works in the opposite direction to the first effect above, the total effect of 
a credit crunch on the capital-output ratio is ambiguous.
In the steady-state analysis, we find that the level of sunk cost of investment 
is important to determine the direction of the total effect of a persistent credit 
crunch. In the model, we assume that a producer has to incur sunk cost to 
expand the size of production by investment. The cost is sunk because it is not 
transferable to the other producers as a part of the capital stock. Examples
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of such cost are the adjustment costs to find new facilities and location of the 
new production, and to find the channel to sell the new products. Also, some 
of the capital stock is producer-specific and not resaleable. Our model implies 
that if the level of the sunk cost is small, then the first effect of a credit crunch 
dominates the second, and causes a decline of the capital-output ratio by the 
reduction of the investment. But if the sunk cost is sufficiently large, then a 
credit crunch increases the capital-output ratio by the endogenous decline of the 
productivity level.
To understand this result, note that if a factor of production is transferred 
between the producers, then the buyer of the factor has to incur the sunk cost 
of investment to enhance her production size. A credit crunch reduces the ag­
gregate sunk cost of investment in the economy by restricting the resource real­
location from the less-productive producers to the more-productive in the credit 
market. Hence, in aggregate, the producers can invest more in the capital stock 
instead of the sunk cost. This effect mitigates the shortage of the capital stock 
under a credit crunch, and makes it more likely tha t a  credit crunch increases 
the capital-output ratio by the endogenous decline of the productivity level. The 
investment-output ratio follows the same result as the capital-output ratio by 
this mechanism.
Note that the productivity gap across the producers is the key component 
of the endogenous decline of the average productivity level by a credit crunch. 
We show tha t the sunk cost of investment contributes to explain the significant 
productivity gap in the economy. This is because the producers who enhance 
the production sizes by investment are the more-productive, as they earn more 
revenues from the production to reinvest into the next production. The sunk cost 
of investment makes their investment more expensive, and reduces their input 
demand. This in turn decreases the input price, and lets the less-productive 
producers stay in production.
Besides the effect of a persistent credit crunch, we also discuss the dynamic 
response of the economy to a temporary credit crunch, and compare it with 
the case of an aggregate negative productivity shock. We find that a credit 
crunch and an negative productivity shock cause similar dynamic responses of 
the output, the average productivity of the economy measured by total factor
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productivity, the capital stock, and the factor price. The difference is their 
effects on the net-worth of the producers, which in turn creates the different 
response of the capital-output ratio. A credit crunch limits the borrowing of 
the producers and reduces their debt-repayments ex-post. Subsequently, the 
reduced debt-repayments increase the net-worth. This lets the capital stock 
recover quickly. However, the recovery of the aggregate output becomes slower 
than the capital stock, as the credit crunch shifts the production resources to the 
low-productive producers, and reduces the average productivity of the economy. 
Then, the capital-output ratio overshoots the steady-state level in the recovery 
under the credit crunch. In contrast, a negative productivity shock reduces the 
output and then the net-worth of the producers. The reduction of the net-worth 
constrains the investment of the producers, and the accumulation of the capital 
stock. Hence, the capital-output ratio remains lower than the steady-state level 
in the recovery period after the negative productivity shock.
A related literature is the general equilibrium analysis of credit market fric­
tions such as Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). Our 
model is built upon the Kiyotaki and Moore model. Casselli and Genaiolli (2 0 0 2 ) 
consider the effect of credit market frictions on the average productivity level of 
the economy, and argue that more credit market frictions allow the inefficient 
family transfer of the production resources, and reduces the average productiv­
ity level. Our model includes the effect of credit market frictions on the average 
productivity level, too, but also analyzes its implication to the capital- and the 
investment-output ratios, which Hayashi and Prescott (2002) take as important 
indicators to identify the cause of the stagnation in Japan after 1990.
Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) and Chen (2001) analyze the macroeconomic 
effect of a credit crunch by formally modeling the role of the bank capital in 
the financial intermediation. Especially, Chen provides a dynamic analysis. The 
difference of our analysis from his analysis is that our analysis considers the 
productivity gap across the producers and the endogenous decline of the average 
productivity level in the economy.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 describes the 
model. Section 3.3 shows the steady-state equilibrium and the effect of a credit 
crunch on the total-factor-productivity level. Section 3.4 compares the dynamic
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effects of a credit crunch and a negative productivity shock. Section 3.5 con­
cludes.
3.2 M odel
We consider a discrete-time economy with homogeneous goods and a continuum 
of agents. There are producers and lenders in the economy. The producers are 
risk-neutral, and each of them maximizes the following utility function:
where cs is consumption at date s, (3 G (0,1) is the discount factor for future 
utility, and E t is expectation formed at date t. Each producer exits from the 
economy with probability 1 — 7  at the end of each date. When she exits, she 
consumes all of her wealth. We follow Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) 
to set this assumption. This assumption of the producer’s behavior lets us 
simply model the regular exit of the firms, and preclude the possibility that 
the producers will ultimately accumulate enough net-worth to self-finance their 
investment.
Each producer has the following production technology at each date t :
yt+l =  A t+1k?l}-a, (3 .2 )
where kt is the capital stock invested in production at date t , lt is the size of 
land invested at date t, y t+ 1 is the output of goods at date t - 1- 1 , and A t+\ is the 
productivity level at date t - 1-1. Hence, there is a period lag between investment 
and production, a  G (0,1) is the constant factor share of capital.
A t+i takes either of the two values A H or A L at each date t+ 1, determined by 
the idiosyncratic stochastic shock to each producer. A H > A L. Each producer 
knows the value of A t+i only after making investment at date t. fiH (G (0,1))
denotes the probability that A t+ 1 =  A H at the next date, when a producer has
A t =  A H at the current date. Similarly, fiL denotes the probability of having 
A H at the next date, when A t = A L. We assume
iiH >  fiL, (3.3)
s = t
s —t (3.1)
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Table 3.1: Transition matrix for the producers
date t + 1
H L Exit
date t
High productivity (H) VH1 (1  -  M* ) 7 (1 - 7 )
Low productivity (L) / 7 ( 1 - / 0 7 (1 - 7 )
Exit from the economy (Exit) 0 0 1
so that the high-productivity level today is followed by the higher expected pro­
ductivity level tomorrow than the low-productivity level today. In summary, the 
transition matrix for the producers is given by Table 3.1. We call the producers 
with jiH as high-productive, and those with /  as low-productive.
The producers rent the capital stock and the land from the lenders. To 
finance the rental cost of capital and land, there is a competitive one-period 
debt market, in which one unit of goods at date t is exchanged for a claim to 
(1 +  r) units of goods at date t + 1. We assume that only debt contracts are 
feasible in the credit market because of the prohibitively high cost to write and 
enforce contingent contracts. We assume that the economy is the small-open 
economy, and that the interest rate r is exogenous. Thus, the lenders have deep 
pockets. 1 To simplify the analysis, we assume
0 ( l +  r) =  l. (3.4)
The production technology is specific to each producer. Once a producer has 
invested into the capital stock and the land at date t, only she has the neces­
sary skill to obtain the full return from the production at date t + 1. Without 
the skill of the producer who initiated the investment, the other producers and 
lenders can obtain only a fraction 0 of the full returns, besides the capital stock 
and the land invested in production. There is no record keeping of the credit 
history. Each producer is free to walk away from the production and from any 
debt obligation between the dates of investment and harvest, and can start new 
production without any default record. We assume that the debtor-producer
1 Given the exogenous interest rate in the small-open economy, the exact form of the house­
hold’s utility maximization to determine the households’ savings is irrelevant to the model.
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has strong bargaining power, and can reduce her debt-repayment down to the 
fraction 6 of the expected output by renegotiation with the lender between the 
dates of investment and harvest. Anticipating the possibility of the renegotia­
tion, the lender limits the amount of credit at date t , so tha t the debt-repayment 
of the debtor-producer at the next date, bt+1, will not exceed the fraction 0 of 
the expected output. This implies that
bt+1 < OEt [yt+i] , (3-5)
where bt+1 is the amount of the debt-repayment at date t - 1- 1 .2
Note tha t the borrowing is constrained by the expected output a t the next 
date in (3.5). We assume that the producer needs to input their skill before 
knowing the realization of the productivity level at date t +  1 , so tha t the pro­
ducer can renegotiate the debt contract only before then. After the output 
realizes, the debtor-producer loses the strong bargaining power to renegotiate 
the debt contract. We also assume
A L > 6E[A |H\. (3.6)
In (3.6), E[A  |i] =  fi'A H + (1  — p ')A L, which is the conditional expectation of 
A t+ 1 at date i, given A t = A 1 for i = H, L. Thus, the face value of the debt 
bt+ 1 is always repaid at date t + 1. We set this assumption to prevent the low- 
productive producers from losing all the net-worth by default .and being unable 
to continue their production due to the borrowing constraint (3.5) . 3 Then, we 
can analyze the resource allocation between the high- and the low-productive 
producers.
6 is the indicator of the efficiency of the credit market. We analyze the effect 
of a credit crunch by lowering the level of 6. This is a short-cut assumption 
to simply model the effect of the credit-supply condition of the financial inter­
mediaries. Implicitly, we assume that the capital of the financial intermediaries 
(the banks) affects the pledgeable fraction of the output by the borrower to the 
lenders, and tha t a crunch of the bank capital reduces 6. Holmstrom and Tirole
2The values of the capital stock and the land do not enter the right-hand side of (3.5), as 
the producers rent these inputs and incur debts to finance the rental costs for them.
3The borrowing constraint prevents the producers from finance all the production cost by 
borrowing, and requires them to make down-payments to buy the production resources from 
their net-worth.
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(1998) and Chen (2001) analyze such a mechanism that a decline of the bank 
capital implies less supply of the informed capital, and raises the returns paid to 
the informed capital. Therefore, the borrowers have less pledgeable repayments 
from their production to the uninformed lenders (the depositors).
We consider the bank-capital specific shock to the economy, and treat the 
shock to 6 independently of the productivity shock. An example of such a shock 
is the analysis provided by Hoshi and Kashyap (1999) such that the Japanese 
banks lost their traditional borrowers, the large firms, to the corporate bond 
market after the financial liberalization in the 1980’s, and lent to inefficient 
small-sized firms due to the lack of experience with this new kind of borrowers. 
These loans turned out to be the non-performing loans problem in the 1990’s. 
Such a mistake made by the banks would reduce the bank capital independently 
of the productivity level of the economy. But it is also true that the bank 
capital is endogenous and would be affected by the productivity shock. From 
this view, our analysis should be interpreted as extracting the indirect effect of 
the productivity shock through a credit crunch and highlighting its characteristic 
separately from the direct effect of the productivity shock.
We further assume that the producers have to incur sunk cost to enhance the 
size of production by investment. The amount of the sunk cost of investment is 
assumed to be
z • max{k?ll~a -  0}, (3.7)
where z is a positive constant. We call k^l]~a as production units. (3.7) reflects 
the adjustment cost for new production units such as costs to find new land, 
facilities, location of production, and channels to sell their new products. In 
(3.7), we assume that this installation of production units is producer-specific, 
and not transferable across the producers. Hence, its cost is sunk. The producers 
need to pay the sunk cost only once for the existing production units, so that the 
amount of the sunk cost is only proportional to the size of the new production 
units, rather than the whole production units.
Given (3.1)-(3.5) and the stochastic exit of the producers, the producer’s
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optimization problem is defined as
max Et ( /?s-< cs ] (3.8)
{cs,ks,is,ba+1} f L t )
-  7 — K  +  uals +  z • max { k fl l~ a -  0 }
1 4 r J
— A Jca / 1 - a  — h 4- 3^+1 
1 +  r
6 .+1 <  e E , A s + lk “ l \~ a
cs , A/S, ^  0
cs =  — 6a if the producer exits.
cs, ks, la and bs, respectively, are consumption, the capital stock, the land invest­
ment, and the amount of debt at date 5 . 8 is the depreciation rate of the capital
stock, r is the exogenous interest rate. 1 — (1  — £ )/( l +  r) is the rental cost of 
capital, and us is the rental cost of land at date s .4 A s is the productivity level of 
the producer. The first constraint is the flow-of-funds constraint, the second the 
borrowing constraint, the third the non-negativity constraint for consumption, 
the capital stock and the land-investment, and the forth the consumption when 
the producer exits from the economy.
3.2.1 Equilibrium
In this chapter, we focus on the case where (a) the borrowing constraint (3.5) 
is binding for all the producers;5 (b) the high-productive producers increase the 
sizes of their production units from the previous levels and incur the sunk cost 
of investment; (c) the low-productive producers decrease their production units 
from the previous levels by short of net-worth, and do not incur the sunk cost of 
investment; and (d) consumption is 0  for each producer until she exits from the 
economy. Hereafter, we solve the model under this conjecture, and then choose 
parameter values such that this conjecture is verified. The appendix contains the 
derivation of the necessary and sufficient conditions for such parameter values 
from the optimization conditions of (3.8). In the numerical simulation below, 
we check tha t these conditions are satisfied.
4u t = qs — E s qs + i / ( l  + r), where qs is the land price at date s.
5More precisely, the producers exiting from the economy do not borrow, so that they are 
not constrained by the borrowing constraint.
S.t. Ca +  1
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It is immediately shown from the cost minimization for a given amount of 
the production units kfl]~Q that
u = __________ aUs___________/ (Q O')
fcs [1 — (1 — i5)/(l + T')l (1 a) ) *
at the optimum of (3.8). (3.9) implies that the capital stock is proportional to 
the land, given the rental cost of land us. We can aggregate the both sides of
(3.9) and obtain from (3.2) and (3.5) with equality that
K l  = [ l - ( l - i ) / ( l ‘+ r ) ] ( l - a ) L‘ (3'10)
*  -  ( i r r o T T i r h + / « • - , )  (3.1.)
( [ i - c - W ^ D K — . ) ) ’  +  d
(3.12)
B i . . - » e [ 3 i w ( | 1 _ ( I _ i ) ~ + r ) | ( 1 _ . | ) ‘ t i  (3.13)
for i = H ,L . K \, L\, Ytl , and B lt+1, respectively, are the aggregate capital 
stock, the aggregate land-investment, and the aggregate output at date t, and 
the aggregate value of the producers’ debt-repayments at date 4 + 1 ,  for the 
high-productive (i = H) and the low-productive (i =  L) producers.
Aggregating the flow-of-funds constraints and substituting (3.10) and (3.13) 
into them, we obtain
0E[A |H]
+  z  — 
Clt ~
1 +  r 
6 E [A  |L\
1 +  r
= 7 [VtH +  i)] (3.14)
^ = 7 + ,  (3.15)
where
" . - ( “ a + W "
*  ■  i r r a - w ^ D K , - . ,  ™
VtH = [(Ah  -  6E[A + (Ah  -  8E[A \L})^l L U ]  <t>U (3.18)
VtL =  [{AL -  8E\A  |/7])(1 -  M*)L®, +  (A h -  8E[A  |L])(l -  „*)!£_,] i- 
(3.19)
Qt is the marginal cost of production except the sunk cost of investment. (f)t 
is the capital-land ratio common to all the producers, which is derived from
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(3.9). VtH and VtL are the aggregate net-worth of the high-productive and the 
low-productive producers at date t , respectively.
(3.14) is the aggregate flow-of-funds constraint for the high-productive pro­
ducers, who incur the sunk cost of investment, z appears in the right-hand side 
of (3.14), because the producers do not have to incur the sunk cost for the ex­
isting production units. (3.15) is the aggregate flow-of-funds constraint for the 
low-productive producers.
We normalize the economy by setting the fixed supply of land equal to 1. 
The market clearing condition for land is
L? + L t  = l. (3.20)
We define equilibrium such that each producer chooses {c3>k3,l3,ba+i}£it to 
maximize (3.8), and {us}£L* clears the land market every date. Under the con­
jecture (a)-(d) described at the beginning of this subsection, (3.14), (3.15) and
(3.20) specify the equilibrium values of {ua, L ^ , L g }  for s > 0, given the pre­
determined aggregate net-worth in the right-hand sides of (3.14) and (3.15) at 
the initial date. Then, (3.10)-(3.13) determine the aggregate investment, the ag­
gregate output, the aggregate value of debts, which recursively determines the 
aggregate net-worth of the producers at the next date by (3.18) and (3.19). Note 
that we have assumed that the productivity transition is idiosyncratic for each 
producer. This assumption implies that there is no aggregate uncertainty, ex­
cept unexpected shocks. Hence, we assume that the agents have perfect foresight 
under the rational expectation.
Remember that each producer is exiting from the economy in some date by 
assumption. To keep the total population of the producers always positive in 
the model, we assume that there is always new entry of the producers into the 
economy. To obtain (3.14) and (3.15), we assume that new producers enter 
the economy with an arbitrarily small net-worth .6 The net-worth of the new 
entrants does not play any other significant role in the model than to keep the 
population of the producers always positive. In (3.14) and (3.15), we take the 
new entrants’ net-worth to the limit at zero.
6Under the binding borrowing constraint, a positive net-worth is necessary to pay the 
down-payment to start the production.
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3.3 Steady-state equilibrium
3.3.1 T he long-run effect o f a persistent credit crunch
In this section, we consider the steady-state equilibrium, and analyze the long- 
run effect of a persistent credit crunch by comparative statics with respect to 
9. The steady-state equilibrium is defined such that all the variables in (3.10)-
(3.20) are constant over time. Substituting (3.18), (3.19) and (3.20) into (3.14) 
and (3.15), we can specify the steady-state equilibrium by the following two 
equations:
L h  _ n s s - e El A\ L] / ( l  +  r ) - 7 ( l - ^ ) ( A L -eE[A\ L] )
1 -  LgS 7(1 -  HH)(AL -  6E[A |H}) V ;
= {7 {E[A IH) -  E[A |L]) -  [1 -  7 (^ "  -  »l)}z}L%s +  y(E[A \L] + y.Lz)
+  9 ( lT 7  -  7)  W  I"! -  E A^ +  E lA W) • (3.22)
The subscript S S  implies the steady-state value of the variable. We obtain
(3.21) from (3.15), and (3.22) by adding (3.14) and (3.15). We can interpret 
these equations such that (3.21) is the response of the aggregate land-investment 
by the high-productive producers, LgS, to the marginal production cost, Qss , 
through the producers’ individual behavior, and that (3.22) is the response of 
Qss to LgS through the market-clearing price determination.
We can find the steady-state equilibrium by drawing (3.21) and (3.22) in the 
L$s — f lss  plane, and show that there exists unique steady-state equilibrium 
under the conjecture (a)-(d) described in the section 3.2.1.7 Figures 3.3 and 3.4 
contain the diagrams. We can show that (3.6) implies that (3.21) is upward- 
sloping in fIss-8 There are two cases for the slope of (3.22), either non-negative 
(Figure 3.3) or negative (Figure 3.4). The slope of (3.22) with respect to L$s is 
9
1-1- r
Thus, the sign of the slope depends on the levels of z and (E[A\H] — jF[A|L]). 
Now we analyze the comparative statics with respect to 9. We assume
- i -  > 7- (3.23)1 + r
+  (1 -  6) 7 (E(A  |H] -  E(A  |L]) -  [1 -  7 ( ^  -  liL)]z.
7Ah > 9E[A |L\ implies that the intercept of (3.22) is larger than (3.21). Note that £lss 
goes to oo as LgS goes to 1 in (3.21). This proves existence of unique steady-state equilibrium.
8(3.21) is the aggregate flow-of-funds constraint for the low-productive. Their land-
investment declines with flss- Then, LgS increases with fIss in tbis equation.
100
(3.23) implies that the survival rate of the producers is not too high. Under 
this assumption, E[A\H] > .E^AIL] and the conjecture (a)-(d) described in the 
previous section, we can show that the right-hand sides of (3.21) and (3.22) are 
increasing in 9.9 This implies that a decline of 9 reduces LgS given Qss in (3.21), 
and Qss given LgS in (3.22). In Figures 3.3 and 3.4, a decline of 9 shifts the 
curve (3.21) leftward, and the curve (3.22) downward.
The intuition behind the reduction of LgS in (3.21) is that a decline of 9 
reduces the borrowing of the producers by tightening their borrowing constraints. 
Given the value of fI5 5 , it limits the leverage taken by the producers. As the 
high-productive producers have the higher rate of return to investment than 
the low-productive, the high-productive suffer from the more loss of the rate 
of return to investment by the limited leverage. Hence, the gap of the rate 
of return between the high- and the low-productive becomes narrower, and the 
relative share of the net-worth shifts to the low-productive in the long run. Then, 
the land allocation also shifts to the low-productive. The intuition behind the 
reduction of Clss in (3.22) is that the reduction of the producers’ borrowing by a 
decline of 9 reduces the aggregate expenditure on the inputs in production. This 
in turn decreases the rental cost of land uss  and the marginal cost of production 
Qss-
The shifts of (3.21) and (3.22) cause an unambiguous decline in LgS as shown 
in Figures 3.3 and 3.4. Qss unambiguously decreases in Figure 3.3, but its di­
rection of change is ambiguous in Figure 3.4. The reason for this ambiguous 
result on ftss  in Figure 3.4 is the negative slope of (3.22). In this case, 2  is 
relatively large compared to the degree of the heterogeneity of the productivity 
levels across the producers [E[A\H] — E[A\L]). Note tha t if LgS is lowered, then 
it is accompanied with less aggregate expenditure on the sunk cost of invest­
ment arising from the resource reallocation from the low-productive producers
9The derivative of the right-hand side of (3.21) with respect to Q is proportional to
1
E[A\ff\[ClSs  ~  7 (1  -  l*L)AL] -  E[A\L\Al
1 +  r - 7 ( 1 - ^ )
The necessary condition for the case that the low-productive producers cut back their produc­
tion sizes is
n SS ~ - E lAM  > A l -  6E[A\L\.
1 + r
By substituting this inequality into flss,  we can show that the sign of the derivative is positive.
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to the high-productive. Then, the saved expenditure on the sunk cost is in­
stead spent on the inputs. Because now the sunk cost is large, saving the sunk 
cost contributes to increase the land price and the cost of production in (3.22). 
Therefore, in Figure 3.4, the reduction of the borrowing by a decline of 9 causes 
the two contradicting effects on flss  5 the effect of limiting the borrowing of the 
producers and reducing the aggregate expenditure on the inputs, and the effect 
of saving the aggregate sunk cost by restricting the resource reallocation to the 
high-productive producers. These contradicting effects make the change of Qss 
ambiguous.
Result 1 summarizes these results.
R esu lt 1: There exists unique steady state. LgS decreases as 9 declines. Qss 
decreases as 9 declines, when 2  is small relative to (E[A \H] — E[A \L\). The 
direction of the change in Qss is ambiguous, when z  is large relative to (E[A\H] — 
E[A |L]).
We measure the average productivity level in the economy by total factor 
productivity (TFP), and define the TFP level by
YtH 4 - Y.LTFP, EE
(KfLi + K U Y
=  E\A \H]L?_1 + E[A  |L](1 -  * £ ,) .  (3.24)
The second equality is obtained from (3.10)-(3.12) . 10 (3.24) implies that the 
aggregate TFP level is determined by the land allocation between the high- 
productive and the low-productive producers. Since (3.24) implies that TFPss  
is increasing in we immediately obtain Result 2 from Result 1.
R esu lt 2: T F P ss  is increasing in 9.11
Now we consider the change of the capital- and the investment-output ratios.
10In (3.24), we use the gross output, rather than the value-added net of the sunk cost of 
investment.
11Caselli and Genaiolli (2003) also show that credit market frictions reduce the TFP level 
of the economy.
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Table 3.2: Parameter values for simulation
a 0 .8 6 7 0.9
r 0.025 5 0 .1
fiH 0.84 fiL 0.28
A H 1.225 A L 1
9 0.75 z 0 .2
Prom (3.10)-(3.12), we can obtain the capital-output ratio at the steady state as 
K§a +  K$B
YsHs +  YSLS T F P s s
oAlss (3.25)
[ l - ( l - 5 ) / ( l  + r)]TFPs s '
The second equality is obtained from (3.17), the definition of <j>t. Thus, the 
capital-output ratio at the steady state is decreasing in T F P s s > and increasing 
in Q,ss- Result 1 implies that a decline of 9 tends to decrease the capital-output 
ratio through tlss, if the level of the proportional sunk cost z is small. But this 
effect is weak if the level of 2  is large and the decline of Slss is small. Result 
2 implies that a decline of 9 contributes to increase the capital-output ratio 
through T F P ss  in all the cases.
To clarify this result, we numerically calculate the derivative of the capital- 
output ratio with respect to 9 at the steady-state equilibrium under the different 
sets of z  and A H/ A L. A H/A L represents the degree of the heterogeneity of the 
productivity levels across the producers. We define the parameters of the model 
at annual frequency, and adopt the base-line parameter values shown in Table 
3.2 for the other parameters than 2  and A H. These parameters are chosen to 
match the steady-state of the model with the Japanese macro and micro-level 
data. See appendix for the detail of the calibration.
Figure 3.5 shows the sign of the derivative of the capital-output ratio with 
respect to 9 over the z — A H/A L plane. The figure implies tha t the derivative is 
negative when z is sufficiently large. The area of the negative derivative is not 
very responsive to A H/ A 1} 2 Thus, the level of z is more important to determine 
the sign of the derivative.
12The area of the negative derivative is expanding as A H / A L increases when A H / A L is
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We consider the implication of these results for the investment-output ratio. 
The aggregate investment into the capital stock is defined as
I t =  K »  + Kf -  (1 -  S ) ( K " X + * £ , ) .  (3.26)
As K^1 and are constant at the steady state, Is s  equals 6(KgS+KgS). Hence, 
the investment-output ratio follows the capital-output ratio in the comparative 
statics in this section. We obtain the following result:
R esu lt 3: Lowering the level of 6 increases the steady-state values of the capital- 
and the investment-output ratios, if z is sufficiently large.
3.3.2 T he role of sunk cost of investm ent to  explain the  
heterogeneity  o f th e producers
In the previous subsection, we have shown that the heterogeneity of the produc­
tivity levels across the producers plays the crucial role in the endogenous decline 
of the average productivity level by a credit crunch. Note that the heterogeneity 
would not exist in the perfectly competitive market, because given the constant- 
returns-to-scale production technology, all the production resources would go 
to the most productive producers. As clarified by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), 
credit market frictions are important to explain the existence of the heterogene­
ity. Credit market frictions limit the borrowing of the most productive produc­
ers, and their purchase of the production resources. Hence, the most productive 
producers cannot accumulate all the production resources in the economy at 
their hands, and the less productive producers can also engage in production.
In this subsection, we argue that it is also important to consider the sunk 
cost of investment to explain the existence of the heterogeneity of the produc­
tivity levels across the producers. For this purpose, we consider the economy
relatively low. This is because the high heterogeneity of the producers increases the endogenous 
decline of the productivity level by a credit crunch. But the area starts slightly shrinking as 
A h / A l increases when AH/ A L is relatively large. This is because the high productivity gap 
allows the high-productive producers accumulate a large part of the capital stock and the land 
for their production. In such a case, a marginal reduction of the resource allocation to them 
by a decline of 6 does not much affect the average productivity level of the economy. Hence, 
the capital-output ratio becomes more likely to be increasing in 6 through the capital stock 
accumulation.
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without the sunk cost of investment, and numerically calculate the model to find 
how much heterogeneity can occur at the steady state without the sunk cost of 
investment.
Set z =  0, and consider the marginal case where the low-productive producers 
engage in production, but do not borrow up to the borrowing limit. Then, the 
marginal productivity of their investment equals the marginal cost of production:
E[A\L] = (l + r)QSs. (3.27)
Note tha t-fiss  is the marginal cost to purchase a production unit k fl l~a , and 
22[A|L] is the expected marginal productivity of the production unit for the 
low-productive producers. If this condition holds, then the marginal produc­
tivity of the investment for the high-productive producers, E[A\H], exceeds the 
marginal cost, and tha t the high-productive producers borrow up to the borrow­
ing limit. Then, we can obtain the amount of the high-productive’s investment 
into the capital stock and the land from their aggregate flow-of-funds constraint 
as follows:
(fiss - 'Pssl'ss =  'iVss + V " , (3.28)
VSHS = » h ( A h  -  0E[A\H])rt>gSL g S +  fiL( 1 +  r)-yVsLs , (3.29)
Vis = ( l - n l l )(AL - e E [ A \ H ] ) ^ s L ^  + ( l - liL)( l  + r)'tVss- (3-30)
(3.28) is the aggregate flow-of-funds constraint of the high-productive producers. 
V N in the right-hand side of the equation is the net-worth of the new entrants 
into the economy. In this section, we explicitly put an arbitrarily small value 
of V N in the equation for presentation purpose. Note that (3.27) implies that 
the rate of return to investment for the low-productive producers is equal to the
market rate of return (1+r), so that their net-worth increases by this rate as
shown in the last two equations (3.29) and (3.30).
Solving (3.27)-(3.30) for L g S , we obtain
Lss =4>SsYN -  7 {{AH -  eE[A\H\)nH
+  i _ ( i  +  r ) 7 ( i _ ^ )  \ ]  ■ t3'31)
If Lg S G [0,1), then the high-productive producers do not use all the land in the 
economy, so tha t the low-productive producers stay in production at the steady
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state. Otherwise, the low-productive do not engage in production. Among such 
cases, LgS > 1 does not occur in our model, because V N is arbitrarily small.13 
If the denominator of (3.31) is negative, then LgS < 0, given 4^ ss > 0- This 
implies that the high-productive producers accumulate more net-worth than the 
cost of investment. The high-productive’s borrowing constraints do not bind, 
and they use all the production resources in the economy. We investigate under 
which parameter values this case occurs.
For this analysis, we compare the different levels of the heterogeneity across 
the producers. We measure the heterogeneity across the producers by the rela­
tive sizes of n H and fiL. Respectively, they are the transition probabilities from 
each productivity level, high and low, at the current date to the high productiv­
ity level at the next date. Thus, the ex-ante productivity levels of the producers 
become more heterogeneous as the gap between and fiL gets larger. We 
numerically calculate the model to find the set of under which L^s is
in [0,1). Besides iiH, fiL and z, we use the values in Table 3.2 for the other 
parameter values.
Figure 3.6 shows the set of (fiH, fiL) under which the low-productive produc­
ers stay in production. The figure implies that the low-productive producers 
are more likely to stay in production when the values of fiH and fiL are close, 
i.e. the heterogeneity across the producers is low. The set of such fiH and fiL 
does not contain ((iH, fiL) =  (0.84,0.28), which is calibrated from the Fukao and 
Kwon (2004) ’s micro data analysis of the Japanese firms. Hence, we need the 
sunk cost of investment to explain these calibrated values. Figure 3.5 is drawn 
under (nH,fiL,z)  =  (0.84,0.28,0.2), and shows tha t both of the high- and the 
low-productive producers stay in production even under such a high level of the 
heterogeneity implied by fiH and fiL.
The intuition for this result is that the high-productive producers receive high 
incomes from their production, and reinvest them to expand their production 
sizes. The sunk cost of investment makes it expensive to expand the production 
sizes, and restricts the accumulation of the production resources by the high- 
productive producers together with credit market frictions. Hence, the low-
13We can numerically show this. If LgS > 1 , then there is an excess demand for land from 
the high-productive producers, and the rental cost of land uss  goes up. This will raise Slss, 
and makes the rate of return to investment by the low-productive less than its marginal cost.
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productive producers can stay in production under the less demand for the 
production resources from the high-productive and the less input prices.
3.4 D ynam ic effect of a tem porary credit crunch
In this section, we analyze the dynamics of the model to a temporary credit 
crunch. The dynamic equilibrium is recursively given by (3.14), (3.15) and
(3.20). We numerically calculate the dynamic equilibrium under the parameter 
values given in Table 3.2.
3.4.1 C redit crunch
We consider an unexpected decline of 9 from 0.75 by 1% at date 0, and its 
gradual recovery following
0t =  0.75 +  0.5(0.75 -  0t_i),
where 9t is the level of 9 associated with the borrowing at date t and the debt 
repayment at date t -1-1. 0.75 is the steady state value of 9. 0.5 is the autore­
gressive coefficient to the mean deviation. The gradual recovery of 9 makes the 
duration of the credit crunch temporary. We assume that the decline of 90 does 
not affect the debt-repayments of the producers at date 0, but only affects the 
borrowing limit. To investigate the effect of the sunk cost of investment, we 
consider the dynamic responses of the economy for z =  0 and 2  =  0.2.
Figure 3.7 and 3.8 show the dynamic paths of 9t and the macroeconomic 
indicators Yt , TFP*, K t, u t , B t+1, I t and L f . Yt is the aggregate output YtH+YtL, 
and K t is the aggregate capital stock equal to +  K f .  B t+i is the aggregate 
debts repaid at the next date equal to I t is the aggregate investment
net of the sunk cost as defined by (3.26). The values in Figure 3.7-3.12 are % 
deviations from their steady-state levels, except for is the aggregate
land share for the more-productive producers.
The dynamics under z =  0.2 shows that the decline of 9 reduces the invest­
ment into the capital stock by tightening the borrowing constraints, and also 
causes a resource shift to the low-productive producers and reduces the total 
factor productivity level. The mechanism behind the resource shift is the same
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as the one described in the previous section, such that a decline of 0 limits the 
leverage taken by the producers, and that the high-productive producers suffer 
from the more loss of the rate of return to investment than the low-productive.14 
Both declines of investment and TFP reduce the aggregate output. The rental 
cost of land declines with the fall of the borrowing of the producers and the 
aggregate expenditure on land.
The feature of the dynamics under z =  0 is the same as z =  0.2, except T F Pt 
and L f .  We can numerically show that under z = 0, the low-productive produc­
ers stop engaging in production, and only the more-productive producers use the 
production resources. Thus, the total factor productivity is constant to be A H. 
Hence, as described in the section 3.3.2, this numerical example highlights that 
the sunk cost of investment contributes to explain the productivity gap across 
the producers and the endogenous fluctuation of the total factor productivity 
level by the credit market shock.
Figure 3.9 shows the dynamic paths of VtH, VtL, K t- i / Y t , and I t /Y t. A no­
table feature is tha t the net-worth of the producers increases after the credit 
crunch. This is because the reduction of the borrowing reduces the debt- 
repayments ex-post, and increases the net-worth of the producers.15 The re­
duced input price ut under the credit crunch contributes to this phenomenon, as 
it makes the reduction of the capital stock and the revenue from the production 
less than the reduction of the borrowing. Then, the net-worth still increases 
despite the reduced output.16
14The reason for the slight increase of TFP at date 1 is that the decline of 9q does not change 
the predetermined net-worth at date 0 , but only increases the required down-payments for the 
producers to buy a production unit. Because of the existence of the sunk cost of investment, 
the required down-payments for the low-productive producers, — 9E[A |L] / ( 1  +  r), more 
proportionally increases than the one for the high-productive producers, f l t + z  — dE[A\H]/(l +  
r). Hence, the resource allocation shifts to the high-productive producers at date 0, and 
increases the TFP level at date 1. After date 1, the mechanism described in the main part 
works through the net-worth of the producers.
15Readers might ask why the producers do not individually refrain from the borrowing to 
maximize their expected net-worth, given the producer’s utility function assumed by .(3.1). 
This is because the producers take the rental cost of land as given in the competitive land 
market, credit market frictions and the binding borrowing constraints limit the amount of the 
borrowing, which reduces the expenditure on the inputs and hence the input price. The low 
input price creates a positive gap between the marginal return to investment and its marginal 
cost. Then, the producers individually find it profitable to borrow up to their borrowing limits. 
This mechanism is found by Biais and Mariotti (2004).
16The comparison between z =  0  and z =  0 .2  shows that the sunk cost of investment 
reduces this effect for the more-productive producers, and increases it for the less-productive 
producers. This is because under z =  0.2, the land share of the more-productive producers
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The capital-output ratio initially declines because the net-worth is predeter­
mined at the impact of the initial shock to 9, and the recovery of the net-worth 
by the reduction of the debt-repayments has not yet taken place. The decline 
of 9 just reduces the capital stock and the capital-output ratio by limiting the 
borrowing of the producers. But the subsequent increase of the net-worth con­
tributes to a quick recovery of the capital stock. Given the endogenous decline 
of the productivity level, the output stays low, and the capital-output ratio over­
shoots the original steady-state level in the recovery period. The dynamics of 
the investment and the investment-output ratio follow this mechanism as well.
3.4.2 N egative productiv ity  shock
For comparison, we derive the dynamic response to an unexpected negative 
productivity shock. It is a short-cut to assume an unexpected shock, but the 
simulation below still highlights the difference between a productivity shock 
and a credit crunch. We keep the productivity gap across the producers Af*/A f  
constant, where A\ is the level of at date t for j  = H, L. We assume that A f  
unexpectedly declines by 1% at date 0, and thereafter follows
/If = 1 + 0 .5(1-41 ,),
1 is the steady-state level of A f . 0.5 is the autoregressive coefficient. As Af*/Af  
is kept constant for all t , all the producers are hit by the same productivity 
shock proportional to their productivity level.
Figures 3.10-3.12 show the same sets of variables as Figures 3.7-3.9, except 
the productivity shock instead of the shock to 9. The qualitative feature of Fig­
ures 3.10-3.11 is the same as Figures 3.7-3.8.17 Despite this similarity, Figure 
3.12 shows that the net-worth and the capital-output ratio behave differently 
from the case of the shock to 9. The decline of the output by the productivity
declines after the shock to 6, and then their aggregate net-worth. On the flip side of the coin, 
the aggregate net-worth of the less-productive producers more increases.
17Only shows the different feature from the case of the shock to 9. increases after
the productivity shock, rather than decreases. In our model, the low-productive producers are 
credit-constrained, and suffer from shortage of the net-worth. Then, the negative productivity 
shock reduces the low-productive’s net-worth more proportionally than the high-productive’s, 
and the production resource shifts toward the high-productive. But the direct effect of the 
negative productivity shock dominates the effect of the resource shift, and reduces the total 
factor productivity of the economy.
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shock first increases the capital-output ratio, since the capital stock is predeter­
mined at the impact of the initial shock. But it also reduces the net-worth of the 
producers.18 This reduction of the net-worth then decreases the investment into 
the capital stock and the capital-output ratio. This implies tha t the effect of 
the reduction of the net-worth is strong enough to create shortage of the capital 
stock in production and to raise the marginal productivity of capital despite the 
decline of the productivity level.
3.5 Conclusion and the im plication to the long 
stagnation in Japan after 1990
In this chapter, we have analyzed the effect of a credit crunch in the model of 
credit market frictions. We have shown that the capital- and the investment- 
output ratios do not necessarily decline in a credit crunch. When the sunk cost 
of investment is sufficiently large, a persistent credit crunch increases these ratios 
by restricting the resource reallocation across the producers in the credit market 
and causing the endogenous decline of the average productivity level.
In the dynamic analysis of a temporary credit crunch, we have shown that the 
credit crunch leads to the subsequent increase of the net-worth of the producers 
by restricting their borrowing and reducing their debt-repayments. This increase 
of the net-worth of the producers contributes to a quick recovery of the capital 
stock, while the credit crunch suppresses the aggregate output by the endogenous 
decline of the average productivity level. Then, the capital- and the investment- 
output ratios overshoot the original steady state level in the recovery period 
after the shock.
While this chapter analyzes the model where all the producers are credit- 
constrained, readers might wonder what if the less-productive producers are not 
credit-constrained, as Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) formulate. This assumption 
would strengthen our result, because a credit crunch would still cause the re­
source shift to the less-productive and the endogenous decline of the average 
productivity level, but it would not constrain the aggregate investment into the
18The effect of the sunk cost of investment on the dynamics of the net-worth is similar to 
the shock to 6, which is described in the footnote 16.
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capital stock, as the less-productive producers invest into the capital stock with­
out the borrowing constraint. Then, a credit crunch would increase the capital- 
and the investment-output ratios. Instead of this assumption, we consider that 
all the producers are credit-constrained. This is to include the effect in the 
analysis that a credit crunch restrains the aggregate investment, which appears 
in the discussion over the credit crunch described in the introduction. Then, 
we have analyzed the changes of the capital- and the investment-output ratios 
under the credit crunch, taking into account this effect.
Our result that the capital- and investment-output ratios do not necessarily 
decrease under the credit crunch provides a counter example to Hayashi and 
Prescott (2002)’s conjecture to preclude a credit market shock as one of the 
causes for the long stagnation in Japan after 1990. Hence, the evidence raised 
by Hayashi and Prescott does not necessarily indicate irrelevance of the credit 
market shock in the 1990’s. The reason for obtaining this result is tha t our model 
considers the productivity gap across the producers, and endogenizes the average 
productivity (total factor productivity) level of the economy, while Hayashi and 
Prescott take it exogenous.
Note that our result does not deny the main result of Hayashi and Prescott 
that the standard exogenous growth model with a productivity slowdown well 
predicts the observed increase of the capital-output ratio. Instead, we have 
shown that qualitatively similar macroeconomic observations can occur under 
the productivity shock and the credit market shock, but that the dynamics 
of the producers’ net-worth are different between these shocks. We suggest 
that investigation into the firm-level data is necessary to identify the source of 
the problem. From this view, the micro-data analysis of the Japanese firms 
such as Nagahata and Sekine (2005) and Ogawa (2003) would be important to 
supplement the macroeconomic analysis.
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Appendix
3.A.1 Derivation of the optimization condition of (3.8)
Substituting (3.9) into k s, we can rewrite the optimization problem (3.8) as
°o + I S  ^ 7*-1 t7Cf + t1 “  fmax{ct,c't ,kt,l't,l'{ ,bt+i} t=0
bt+i <  0 £ t ^ + i 1 — O'
( S ) V s ( S j
i't> 0 
ct > 0
cj = AtkSLil}:^ -  bt .
dt is the consumption when the producer exits from the economy. Vt is the land 
investment more than the previous land investment, and is the one up to the 
previous level. In terms of notation in (3.8), It =  l't  +  I'(• Thus, the max-operator in 
the flow-of-funds constraint in (3.8) is replaced by the third and the forth constraints.
We substitute the first and last constraints into c s and c's , and form the Lagrange 
function as follows:
L=£ (/37)t£o {(1+ni't] At +l"-i] - bt + t5 t
OLUt
+ m,t 
+ m,t
0 E t A t+1
aut 
1 — a (4 +  j?) - fc+i
+ E /5 V ‘ 1(1-7)£'o
t= 0
r jjyt is the Lagrange multiplier for the j  +  1 th constraint in the optimization problem 
above for the high-productive and the low-productive producers, respectively, for j  =  
1 , 2 , 3 , 4 .
First of all, the borrowing limit must be less than the cost of production to have
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I't : (1 +  V4,t) + m,t
the borrowing constraints binding, and requires the producers to spend some down­
payment to make investment. The sufficient condition for this case is
1 + r
The Euler equations are obtained as
bt+1 : 1 +  774,* =  (1 +  t*)[771,* +  p  +  P iE tT fe 't+ i]  (3-32)
i't • m ,t +  m ,t =  (1 +  m ,t )z  (3-33)
QEtAt+1
1 +  r
= pyEt [(1 +  774,*+i)(A*+i -  9EtAt+i) + 772,*+i] +  [3{1 -  7)(1 — 6)EtA t +1
(3.34)
where j)3i, =  t?3,i{(l -  a)[l -  (1 -  S)/(l + r)]/(a» i))“ .
In the main section, we conjecture the binding borrowing constraints, the expan­
sion of the production sizes by the high-productive producers, the reduction of the 
production sizes by the low-productive producers, and zero consumption until exit. 
This case corresponds to
>  0. V2,t >  °. *13,t =  r f t  >  0. and
7ii,t > ° 5 v it  =  v it > vi\t >  °> f° r a111 > o- (*)
The subscripts H  and L denote the Lagrange multipliers for the high-productive and 
the low-productive producers, respectively. Thus, the value of the Lagrange multi­
plier only depends on the current productivity level of the producer. In the steady 
state, these Lagrange multipliers take constant values. Given the convergence to the 
steady state, we can numerically calculate the Lagrange multipliers, and check that 
the conditions above are satisfied.
Besides the optimization conditions above, the high-productive producers must 
have enough net-worth to expand their production sizes. Also, the low-productive 
producers must be short of the net-worth to expand their production sizes. These 
conditions are
n t -  < A H -  $E[A\H]
Sit -  f M d S  > a l  -  8E[A\L], 1 + r
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3.A .2 Parameter values for the simulation in Table 3.2
We define the parameters of the model at annual frequency. The parameters are 
chosen to match the steady-state of the model with the Japanese macro and micro­
level data, a  is chosen to match with the average ratio of the land value to the value of 
the capital stock held by the non-financial companies. This ratio had been stable for 
1970-1985 before the asset-price bubble in the late 1980’s, and its average was 0.814. 
7  is chosen to replicate the ratio of the capital-income to the value of the capital stock 
equal to 6.6. This number is equivalent to have the capital-output ratio equal to 2.2 in 
the industrial data complied by Fukao et al (2003), given that 0.33 is the capital share 
in the aggregate Cobb-Douglas production function of capital and labor, r is taken 
from Hayashi and Prescott (2002)’s calibration of the steady-state time-discount rate. 
6 is the conventional value for the depreciation rate for the capital stock, which is 
adopted by Kiyotaki and West (2004). f iH, \xL and A H  are calibrated to match with 
the firm-level data analysis of the Japanese manufacturing firms, conducted by Fukao 
and Kwon (2004). A L is normalized to be 1. 9  is chosen to match the average ratio of 
the retention from the capital income of the non-financial companies, which was stable 
around 0.25 over the 1980’s. We choose z  — 0.2, under which both of the high- and 
low-productive producers engage in production with binding borrowing constraints. 
This parameter value roughly implies that 20% of the expenditure for investment is 
sunk.
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Figure 3.1: The capital-output ratio in Japan
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Source: Data appendix of Hayashi and Prescott (2002).
Note: ” All sectors” is quoted from Hayashi and Prescott. The capital stock 
includes the residential capital and the capital in the foreign countries, and the 
output is GNP. ’’Firms” is the capital stock of the firms over GNP.
Figure 3.2: The investment-output ratio in Japan
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Source: Data appendix of Hayashi and Prescott (2002).
Note: ”d(bankloans)/Y” is the annual change of the bank loans to the firms 
over GNP. ”I/Y ” is the investment by the firms over GNP.
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Figure 3.3: The steady-state equilibrium (Non-negative slope of (3.22))
! (21)fi ss
Note: The shifts of the curves are made by a reduction of 6.
Figure 3.4: The steady-state equilibrium (Negative slope of (3.22))
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Note: The shifts of the curves are made by a reduction of 6.
Figure 3.5: d ( K / Y ) / d O  around 6 =  0.75 at the steady state
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Note: In the area ”d(K /Y)/dO  < 0” , the derivative is negative around 9 =  0.75 
at the steady state under the values of z and A H/A L and the other parameter 
values specified in Table 3.2. In the area ”d (K /Y ) /d 0  > 0” , the derivative 
is positive. In the blank area at the lower-right corner, the low-productive 
producers do not borrow up to their borrowing limits because their relative 
productivity level is too low. In the blank area at the upper-left corner, the 
high-productive producers do not borrow up to the capacities because the sunk 
cost of investment to expand their production sizes is too high.
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Figure 3.6: The heterogeneity of the productivity levels across the producers at 
the steady state without sunk cost of investment________________________
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Note: The model is simulated under z — 0. In the area ’’Only H”, only the 
high-productive producers engage in production at the steady state. In the 
area ”H and L” , the low-productive producers also engage in production, either 
having binding borrowing constraints or not. The lower triangle area denoted 
by ” (/zL > //H)” is excluded from the analysis, as i^H > fiL by assumption.
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Figure 3.7: The dynamic response of the economy to a shock to 9
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Note: The parameter values are described in Table 3.2. ”% of SS” is the % 
deviation from the steady state level of each variable. The time frequency is a 
year.
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Figure 3.8: The dynamic response of the economy to a shock to 9
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Note: The parameter values are described in Table 3.2. ”% of SS” is the % 
deviation from the steady state level of each variable. The time frequency is a 
year.
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Figure 3.9: The dynamic response of the economy to a shock to
z = 0 .2  
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Note: The parameter values are described in Table 3.2. ”% of SS” is the % 
deviation from the steady state level of each variable. The time frequency is a 
year.
Figure 3.10: The dynamic response of the economy to a shock to A H and A L
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Note: The parameter values are described in Table 3.2. ”% of SS” is the % 
deviation from the steady state level of each variable. The time frequency is a 
year.
Figure 3.11: The dynamic response of the economy to a shock to A H and A L
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Note: The parameter values are described in Table 3.2. ”% of SS” is the % 
deviation from the steady state level of each variable. The time frequency is a 
year.
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Figure 3.12: The dynamic response of the economy to a shock to A H and A L
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Note: The parameter values are described in Table 3.2. ”% of SS” is the % 
deviation from the steady state level of each variable. The time frequency is a 
year.
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Concluding remarks
In this dissertation, the chapter 1 empirically confirms the productivity slow­
down in Japan after 1990 by controlling for the unobserved capacity utilization 
and non-constant returns to scale in production. The chapter 2 shows that pro­
ductivity slowdowns can be caused by shocks to the credit market and the firm 
dynamics, and clarifies the mechanism of the remaining low-productive firms 
in production and the decline of the firms’ borrowing under the productivity 
slowdown. The chapter 3 shows that the credit market shock can cause the fea­
tures of the capital- and the investment-output ratios in Japan after 1990, and 
that these features do not necessarily indicate irrelevance of the credit market 
shock in the long stagnation in Japan after 1990, as opposed to the conclusion 
of Fumio Hayashi and Edward Prescott in their work published in the Review 
of Economic Dynamics in 2002.
Over all, this dissertation clarifies that the credit market shock hampers 
the resource allocation across the firms, and causes an endogenous productivity 
slowdown. This result is important, as the disturbance in the credit market 
is one of the distinct features of the Japanese economy after 1990. Also, this 
result clarifies that the insight of the work of Nobuhiro Kiyotaki and John Moore 
published in the Journal of Political Economy in 1997 synthesizes the classical 
Prescott-Summers debate on the source of the economic fluctuation.
Even though the role of banking is only implicitly analyzed in the chapter 
3, the result of the dissertation implies that further research on banking in the 
general equilibrium framework is promising to further understanding of the long 
stagnation in Japan. This dissertation also clarifies that the gradual decline of 
the land price under the sustaining productivity slowdown is a puzzling feature 
of the Japanese economy after 1990. As mentioned at the end of the chapter 2, it
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is necessary to investigate how the supply of effective land was increasing under 
the large public investment in the 1990’s, and also how people updated their 
expectation over the future land prices under the unexpected and sustaining 
productivity slowdown in the 1990’s. It is for the future research to analyze 
these aspects of the economy.
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